CONTENTS
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF SUDAN 1
1.1 POPULATION, ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND ECONOMIC INDEX 2
1.2 CONFLICT HISTORY OF SUDAN 3
2. ISSUES IN CONTENTION 5
3. CONFLICT DIMENSION OF SUDAN 7
4. ACTORS IN THE NEGOTIATION& BARGAINING PROCESS 8
4.1 MAIN PARTIES &THEIR INTERESTS 8
4.2 INTERNATIONAL PARTIES & THEIR INTEREST 9
5 NATURE OF THE BAGAINING 11
6 DARFUR 15
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR 15
6.2 ISSUES IN CONTENTION IN DARFUR 16
6.3 CONFLICT DIMENSION OF DARFUR 18
6.4 CHRONOLOGY OF THE DARFUR PEACE BARGAININGS
7 SUCCESS OF THE BARGAINING 30
8 THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT? 32
9 POST CONFLICT SITUATION & PRESENT CONDITION 32
9.1 SUDAN DDR PROGRAMME 33
9.2 INTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICT & DISARMANENT 34
9.3 PRESENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN SUDAN 36
9.4 PRESENT SITUATION IN DARFUR 37
10 CONCLUSION 38
REFERENCES
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF SUDAN
Source: Produced by Reliefweb, 12 April 2004, and reproduced on the DFID website, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/DFIDAroundWorld/africa/darfurmap.
Sudan, in Northeast Africa, is the largest country on the continent, measuring about one fourth the size of the United States. Its neighbors are Chad and the Central African Republic on the west, Egypt and Libya on the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea on the east, and Kenya, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo on the south. The Red Sea washes about 500 mi of the eastern coast. It is traversed from north to south by the Nile, all of whose great tributaries are partly or entirely within its borders.
What is now northern Sudan was in ancient times the kingdom of Nubia, which came under Egyptian rule after 2600 B.C. An Egyptian and Nubian civilization called Kush flourished until A.D. 350. Missionaries converted the region to Christianity in the 6th century, but an influx of Muslim Arabs, who had already conquered Egypt, eventually controlled the area and replaced Christianity with Islam. During the 1500s a people called the Funj conquered much of Sudan, and several other black African groups settled in the south, including the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, and Azande.
Egyptians again conquered Sudan in 1874, and after Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, it took over Sudan in 1898, ruling the country in conjunction with Egypt. It was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan between 1898 and 1955. The 20th century saw the growth of Sudanese nationalism, and in 1953 Egypt and Britain granted Sudan self-government. Independence was proclaimed on Jan. 1, 1956. Since independence, Sudan has been ruled by a series of unstable parliamentary governments and military regimes.
1.1. POPULATION, ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND ECONOMIC INDEX
CAPITAL: Khartoum, 5,717,300 (metro. area), 1,397,900 (city proper) (2003 EST.)
LARGEST CITIES: Omdurman, 2,103,900; Port Sudan, 450,400
POPULATION (2007 est.): 42,292,929 (growth rate: 2.5%); birth rate: 33.9/1000; infant mortality rate: 59.6/1000; life expectancy: 59.3; density per sq mi: 46
LANGUAGES: Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English
ETHNICITY/RACE: Black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%
RELIGIONS: Islam (Sunni) 70% (in north), Indigenous 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum)
LITERACY RATE: 61% (2003 EST.)
ECONOMIC SUMMARY:
GDP/PPP (2005 est.): $84.93 billion; per capita $2,100. Real growth rate: 7.7%.
INFLATION: 11%. Unemployment: 18.7% (2002 EST.). Arable land: 7%.
AGRICULTURE: cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic, sugarcane, cassava (tapioca), mangos, papaya, bananas, sweet potatoes, sesame; sheep, livestock.
LABOR FORCE: 11 million (1996 est.); agriculture 80%, industry and commerce 7%, government 13% (1998 EST.).
INDUSTRIES: Oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, armaments, automobile/light truck assembly. Natural
resources: petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower.
EXPORTS: $6.989 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.): oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts, gum Arabic, sugar.
IMPORTS: $5.028 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.): foodstuffs, manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment, medicines and chemicals, textiles, wheat.
MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS: China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, India, Germany, Australia (Infoplease.com 2007)
1.2 CONFLICTS HISTORY OF SUDAN
The history of Sudan is a history of continued and unlimited violence. Yet, man, as a social being needs security and peace for life to be meaningful, for any meaningful development to occur, and for life to be enjoyed. Unfortunately, both variables have eluded Sudan since independence in 1956, and more especially since the declaration of Islamic law through out the country in 1983, by President Jafaru Nimieri, and introduction of the Islamization policy in 1989 by military dictator, General El-Bashir.
According to Nwolise (2004), the Sudanese crisis has remained the longest in Africa, and most neglected by the world has commenced in 1956, then fuelled by the hoisting of Islamic Sharia on the whole country including the Christian and Traditionalist South in 1989, and finally by the Darfur insurgency of February 2003. The chronicle of events, as shown below, has given an insight or sign-post to the Sudan (Darfur) crisis:
1898-1956: Sudan came under the Anglo-Egyptian control. But the South fought rebelliously to regain control and freedom.
1955: The Anya-Anya (military wing of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) of Joseph Lagu) war commenced in the South, leading to political control being exerted over the region, a situation that further led to 17 years of North-South Conflict.
1956: Independence came under the rule of National Unionist Party, but this did not end the North-South conflict.
1956-1969: Civil rule with strong opposition by the Sudan Communist Party agitating for democracy, sovereignty of Sudan from neo-colonial forces, and social progress.
1969: Military coup brought Jafaru Nimieri to power as President. His presidency moved politics away from pro-Eastern European Socialism to Islamic revivalism.
1975: Revival of the Anya-Nya war due to southern discontent.
1980: Oil was found in the South, and Nimieri reneged on the 1972 Accord signed in Addis Ababa to exploit the oil without restriction. Additionally, provisions that gave the South financial autonomy and rights to collect all taxes of the central government in the south were abolished. Nimeri became dictatorial, created a new Province removing jurisdiction of the oil region from the south.
1983: President Nimeri introduced the Islamic law system in the whole Sudan including the southern Christian and Traditionalist Religion, in order to gain support from the important Muslim Brotherhood.
1983: John Garang became the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) with an ideology on a united secular Sudan.
1986: Sadiq El-Mahdi was elected President of Sudan. The economy collapsed and war escalated in the South.
1989: War effects and famine led to the death of over 1,000,000 people.
1989 (June 30): Military coup that brought Omar El-Bashir in to power who began the Islamization of the whole country including Southern Sudan. This exacerbated the war.
1991: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement gained control of the South under the leadership of John Garang.
1998: Severe famine worsened Sudan’s problems. War situation could not allow humanitarian aid reaches the hungry in the South (Okereke 2005)
1999-2002: Upstage of discrimination by the Arab controlled government against non-Arabs (Black Africans). Since 1999 international attention has been focused on evidence that slavery is widespread throughout Sudan. Arab raiders from the north of the country have enslaved thousands of southerners, who are black. The Dinka people have been the hardest-hit. Some sources point out that the raids intensified in the 1980s along with the civil war between north and south.
July 2002: A cease-fire was declared between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in July 2002. During peace talks, which continued through 2003, the government agreed to a power-sharing government for six years, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination for the south. Fighting on both sides continued throughout the peace negotiations. In May 2004, a deal between the government and the SPLA was signed, ending 20 years of brutal civil war that resulted in the deaths of 2 million people.
February 2003: Darfur conflict started with the rebel movements of Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equity Movement starting their rebellious acts against Khartoum.
2004 (January): Just as Sudan's civil war seemed to be coming to an end, another war intensified in the north- western Darfur region. After the government quelled a rebellion in Darfur in Jan. 2004, it allowed pro-government militias called the Janjaweed to carry out massacres against black villagers and rebel groups in the region. These Arab militias, believed to have been armed by the government, have killed between 200,000 and 300,000 civilians and displaced more than 1 million. While the war in the south was fought against black Christians and animists, the Darfur conflict is being fought against black Muslims.
2006: The slaughter in Darfur escalated, and the Khartoum government remained defiantly indifferent to the international communities' calls to stop the violence. The 7,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers deployed to Darfur proved too small and ill equipped a force to prevent much of it.
2006 (May): A fragile peace deal was signed between the Sudanese government and the main Darfur rebel group; two smaller rebel groups, however, refused to sign. The UN reported that there has in fact been a dramatic upsurge in the violence since the agreement. The Sudanese government reneged on essential elements of the accord, including the plan to disarm the militias and allow a UN peacekeeping force into the region to replace the modest AU force.
In. Jan. 2007, Sudan and Darfur rebel groups agreed to a 60-day cease-fire, which was intended to lead to peace talks sponsored by the African Union.
In July 2007, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to deploy as many as 26,000 peacekeepers from the African Union and the United Nations forces to help end the violence in Darfur.
2 ISSUES IN CONTENTION
BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY OF DIVIDE AND RULE:
One of the factors that have been identified to be responsible for fuelling the crisis in Sudan is the British colonial policy of divide and rule tactics which intensified the traditional Afro-Arab dichotomy and laid the foundation for the politics of non-accommodation, which translated into overt inter- racial conflict after independence. Throughout the period of colonial occupation, British officials strictly segregated northern and southern Sudan, especially between 1925 and 1947. The principal motives according to Okereke (2005) “were to prevent the spread of Arab nationalism and curtail the wave of anti-colonialism”. Britain banned the teaching of Arabic and the use of Arabic names in the south. The activities of Christian missionaries were also banned in the north. These colonial policies widened the north-south or Black/Arab divide, heightening the resentment for the non-Muslim population in the south. This policy created serious gulfs between the Blacks and Arabs in the country and on gaining independence in 1956, resentment was further inflamed by the Arabization campaigns of the northern-controlled government. These made it possible for the Arabs to occupy virtually all the senior civil service positions under the guise of ‘Sudanization’ (ibid).
POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN BLACKS AND ARABS:
From time, there has been power struggle between the Black and Arab Sudanese, with the Black Sudanese calling for Regional autonomy within Sudan since the conference in Juba, Southern Sudan in 1947 (Isiaku 2005). Secession from the Sudan came to represent a major goal of Southern Liberation Movements, SSLM and SPLA, headed by Joseph Lagu and John Garang, respectively. Joseph Lagu (2005) gave the goal of the struggle of the southern people as: the rights of self-determination for our people to determine its destiny, either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region or to have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that of our African brothers in their states on our southern borders”.
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL OF THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT POLICIES OF ACCOMMODATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION:
Sudan is a country with diverse ethnic, racial, religious and economic population. This is pronounced or manifested in the constitution bequeathed to the country by the British colonial ruler of the country. According to Aliyu (2005), the unitary constitution inherited from the British was not successful “in integrating a country divided along cultural, religious and racial lines”. This, coupled with bad leadership had made the problem to persist.
According to Al Karsani (2005), “decades of bad governance, have been a primary cause of endemic conflict and human suffering”. Just like the previous governments before it, the government of El-Bashir (the current President of Sudan) has concluded 18 conferences, and peace meetings, it failed to implement these Agreements, or live up to the expectations of southern dissidents.
SOUTHERN SUDAN STRATEGIC RESOURCES ENDOWMENT:
Sudan’s natural resources, which are strategically located in the south, are of critical importance to whoever controls in Khartoum. The Nile River, which is the mainstay of Sudan’s economy, is located in the south. The location of the Upper Nile in southern Sudan is of immense significance to the Sudan as it provides a latent leverage on Egypt whose life wire is the Nile. It is therefore in the overall interest of the Sudanese state to remain a united country. More significantly too is that oil deposits have been found in the southern part which further enhances the region’s significance for the entire country.
THE DECLARATION OF ISLAMIC LAWS IN SUDAN:
The violent agitations against discrimination whose roots date back to 1956, but aggravated into full scale war by the declaration of Islamic law throughout the whole of Sudan by the military junta of El-Bashir in 1989. This declaration faced stiff armed opposition from the Southern part of the country inhabited by Christians and traditional religionists. Despite the resentment from the Christians and traditional religionists over the introduction of the Sharia legal code to cover the entire country, the government in Khartoum was supported by Islamic fundamentalists mounted pressure on the government to intensify political control and implement the Islamic legal code throughout the country.
PROLIFERATION OF MILITANT GROUPS ALL OVER SUDAN:
Another factor that has been identified as contributing in escalating the war in Sudan is the proliferation of militant groups. Peter Moszynski (2004) notes that there are over 30 different armed militia groups with assorted weapons and arms operating around Sudan. The South African Institute for Strategic Studies observed that these peripheral players are fearful that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process will deepen their own marginalization.
THE RACIAL WAR (GENOCIDE) IN THE DARFUR REGION:
Darfur is on the West side of Sudan, and is inhabited mainly by Muslims who are Black Africans. This is the region being wiped out by Arab militias (Janjaweed) and ably supported by the government in Khartoum. The Darfur war began in February 2003 when two armed opposition groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equity Movement
(JEM) rose against the Arab dominated government for discriminating against Black Africans.
THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1884 AND PARTITION OF AFRICA:
It has been argued by several scholars that one of the main factors responsible for the unending inter-state and intra-states wars in Africa was the effect of the 1884 Berlin Conference in which Western powers partitioned Africa amongst themselves and brought people who were not of the same ethnic group with different and diverse cultures and forced into nation states. One of such countries suffering from the effect of that partition is Sudan. Writing on the effect of the partition of Africa on the continent and its people, the World History Chronology observed as follows: The Berlin Act was an important change in international affairs. It created the rules for “effective occupation” of conquered lands, ensuring that the division of Africa would take place without war among the European powers. Through the Berlin Act, the European powers justified dividing a continent among themselves without considering the desires of the indigenous peoples. While this appears extremely arrogant. The Berlin Conference is one of the clearest examples of the assumptions and preconceptions of this era, and its effects on Africa can still be seen today. The arbitrary boundaries the Europeans imposed often divided an ethnic group and also brought enemies under the same government causing strife that still exists today (World History Chronology 2007). Sudan of course, is one of casualties of this abnormality as Black Africans who have nothing in common in terms of culture, language and ways of life were forced to live together by the partition with Arabs.
THE COLD WAR PHENOMENON:
The cold war between the Eastern and Western blocs contributed significantly to the war in the Sudan. What the cold war did was to obscure the central thrust of the conflict because of the ideological planks upon which both the government and the south legitimize their positions and appeal from either the US or the former Soviet Union.
3. DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN
It was estimated that more than 5 million Sudanese are facing starvation and that the civil war had left at least one-third of the south's 6 million people homeless. The horror of the famine was merely sharpened by the politics of the civil war. More than $50 million worth of food relief provided by the United States for those starving in the south was reportedly given away or sold to the regime's supporters in the north, and the government was deliberately blocking food shipments to the south. The misery brought on by drought, famine, and civil war was compounded by a meningitis epidemic that struck the country. Within a few months the disease had killed some 1,600 people, many of them children.
Crippled by drought and war, Sudan has an external debt of more than $36 billion, the second largest in Africa Early in the year, Sudan appealed to its creditors to give it 40 years to repay its foreign debt. The economic base of Sudan is also adversely affected as a result of the conflict.
Internally Displaced 4 million, mostly southerners Refugees 490,000, mostly southerners Deaths due to war More than 2 million (and up to 4 million) since 1983, mostly southern civilians
Before the recent referendum which brought an end to the hostilities, it was costing the Sudanese government US$1 million per day to prosecute the war.
4. WHO ARE THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS PROCESSES?
4.1. THE MAIN PARTIES IN SUDAN & DARFUR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
GOS - Government of Sudan – the North
Political parties in the North
DUP - Democratic Unionist Party – Northern Political Party
NIF - National Islamic Front – Northern Political Party
Umma - Northern Political Party
NORTHERN INTERESTS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN
Peace and security
Resources control
Islamic law
International respect
Avoid Terrorism Stigma of Axis of Evil
Economic growth/development
Oil/resource development
Sudanese unity
Power (political, societal, and economic)
SPLM/A - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army - representing the South
Political parties in the South
SSDF - South Sudan Defense Force – Southern Political Party
UDSF - United Democratic Salvation Front - Southern Political Party (these joined the SPLM/A to work together for peace)
DARFUR- Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)
SOUTHERN INTERESTS
Peace
Self-governance
Freedom of religion
Recognition
Repatriation of refugees
Economic growth/development
Oil/resource development
Equality
Representation in Sudan
Repatriation of internally displaced persons
DARFUR INTEREST
Power sharing
Resource sharing
Economic growth and development
Land ownership
Demobilizing the Janjaweed
Equality
Representation in Sudan
Prosecution of War crime offenders
4.2 INTERNATIONAL PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development – the mediating party
Neighbouring nations: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo
IGAD THE MEDIATORS’ INTERESTS
Peace
Regional security
Stopping terrorist threats
Economic/social development
Maintain legitimacy
Refugee safety
Humanitarian law
Oil/resource development
Power (political, societal, and economic)
Border control
UNITED STATES/ INTEREST
Stop the development of terrorist cells in Sudan
Economic/social development
Democracy/representation of the South
Humanitarian law
Peace
Regional security
Regional influence
Trade relations
Border control
Refugee safety
Border control
Oil/resource development
AFRICAN UNION & UNITED NATIONS/INTEREST
Peace
Regional security
Stopping terrorist threats
Economic/social development
Trade relations
Water security
Refugee safety
Humanitarian law
Oil/resource development
Representation of the south
Maintain legitimacy
Border control
EUROPEAN UNION/INTEREST
Peace
Development
Oil access
Human Rights
OTHER INFLUENTIAL NATIONS/INTEREST
Peace
Regional security
Stopping terrorist threats
Economic/social development
Trade relations
Refugee repatriation
Humanitarian law
Oil/resource development
Border control
Working relations
CHINA/ INTEREST
Oil access
Peace
Development
ARAB LEAGUE/INTEREST
A united Sudan that will remain within the Arab regional organization and the power to exert influence over the South, where the Nile waters gain their capacity to feed the lower Nile and the waters of Egypt
Water security and control over the Nile
Regional security/stability
Oil/resource development
Economic/social development
Maintaining a positive relationship with the US regarding the war on terrorism
Refugee safety
Peace
Humanitarian law
Trade relations
Representation of the South
4. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE BARGAINING THAT TOOK PLACE SUDAN AND DARFUR?
NATURE
Track 1& II:
Back-channeling
Shuttle diplomacy
Deconstructing underlying interests
Face to face
Mediators
Use of single-text documents
Linkage: Infrastructure and resource development with peace
Ripeness: War fatigue
TRACK II NEGOTIATIONS
As the civil war in Sudan spiraled out of control and the effects of the conflict began to impact on the entire region, neighbouring nations and the broader international community represented in the UN called for peace. In the 1990s, the negotiation process began with the first meeting of the parties through shuttle diplomacy. Leaders from Nigeria, Uganda and Egypt held talks with individual representatives to try and determine the underlying interests of each side. This Track II diplomacy option not only helped each region to uncover its interests, but also helped establish the need for negotiations and peace. Through dialogue, international actors like IGAD and the then Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida were able to find common interests on which to base the negotiations.
LINKAGE
The parties began to broach the subject of a mediated negotiation as Sudan’s infrastructure became severely impaired. A strategy adopted by the UN to bring conflicting parties to the negotiation table, is by linking peace with the development of the entire country.
The international donors, particularly the US, began to decrease their investment in infrastructure and development programmes in Sudan in order to demonstrate the true cost of war on the national economy. The primary reasons for the international communities’ withdrawal of funds were based on the fact that ‘the UN agencies willingly embraced the strategy of linking rehabilitation, development and peace.
RIPENESS
With the fatigue of war, the two parties acknowledged the toll that the conflict had taken on the nation in economic degradation, loss of international credibility and human suffering. The GOS and SPLM/A were ripe to negotiate. They came to terms with the idea that neither party would win the war and that their best alternative was to negotiate face to face in a Track I dialogue.
TRACK I NEGOTIATIONS
Members of the Inter- Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). IGAD is a regional organization comprising of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda, set up two committees consisting of two organs: a summit committee of heads of States from her member states and a standing committee composed of their mediators.
In November 1993 and January 1994, preliminary talks were held in Kenya. In March and May 1994, formal negotiations began. At the May meeting the peace talks presented the Declaration of Principle (DOP) which included the following:
1. The right of self determination with national unity as high priority.
2. Separation of religion from the State.
3. A system of governance based on multi-party democracy
4. Decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy.
5. Respect for human right.
6. Referendum to be held in the South with secession as an option
The National Islamic Front (NIF) initially resisted the DOP, particularly self determination and secularization. The SPLA on the other hand accepted the DOP.
The IGAD peace process began with the view that the Sudan conflict was having serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region and sought to deal with the root causes of the conflict.
In September 1994, then president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi convened a meeting of the committee’s heads of State, Sudan’s president Omar al Bashir and the leader of SPLA, John Garang. The Khartoum government walked out of the peace negotiations rejecting the DOP.
In 1997, as a result of loss of military grounds as well intense international pressures the GOS returned to the negotiating table in Nairobi and they formally accepted the DOP.
Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow divisions between the two sides with government of Sudan formally agreeing to self determination for the South.
In May 1998, the parties disagreed on which territories were considered part of the south. The Khartoum delegation defined the south as the three provinces of Bahrel el Ghazel, Equatoria and upper Nile
In early August 1998 in Addis Ababa, the peace negotiation collapsed, due to differences in the role of religion in politics and on territorial definition of Southern Sudan.In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi, but failed to make progress.
In early June 2001 the heads of states from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea met in Nairobi to reactivate the stalled IGAD peace negotiations. President Omar Bashir of Sudan and John Garang leader of SPLA were in attendance. The talks failed to produce an agreement.
In the month of September 2001, then President of the USA, George Bush appointed John Danforth a former Senator, as Special Envoy for the peace in Sudan. On September 28, 2001, the sanctions imposed by Clinton administration in 0ctober 1997 was lifted by George Bush.
In late November 2001 and early January 2002, Danforth made his first visit to Sudan and other neighbouring countries to assess the Sudan peace process and humanitarian conditions.
He (Danforth) met with President Bashir of Sudan and Senior government officials. He also met with officials of the opposition controlled Southern Sudan and Senior officials of the SPLA.
In Nairobi, Kenya, he met with Arap Moi and in Egypt Danforth met with Hosni Mubarak and senior government officials. Danforth was given the mandate to ascertain if there is a role for the USA to play in the peace process.
As part of his mandate, he first sought to test the parties to the conflict to determine if they were serious about a negotiated settlement. He proposed four confidence building measures. These included:
1. A ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region to facilitate relief assistance.
2. The creation of “days of tranquility” to administer immunizations and provide humanitarian relief assistance.
3. An end to aerial bombardments of civilian targets.
4. The creation of an Eminent Persons Group on slavery in Sudan.
In January 2002, Special Envoy Danforth met senior government officials in Khartoum with the officials of SPLA in Rumek in Southern Sudan to discuss his proposed initiatives. Envoy Danforth’s mission succeeded in securing a ceasefire agreement and received the support of the parties his other two proposals.
After the ceasefire came into force in January 2002, IGAD mediators along with international observers from the US, UK, Norway the African Union, and the UN, the government of Sudan and the SPLA, facilitated the signing of the Machakos Protocol in Kenya in July 2002.
Under the Machakos Protocol, an outline for a pre interim period of six months was reached. It was also declared that:
1. The institutions and mechanisms provided for in the peace agreement shall be established.
2. If not already in force, there shall be a cessation of hostilities with appropriate monitoring mechanisms established.
3. Mechanisms to implement and monitor the peace agreement shall be created.
4. Preparations shall be made for the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire as soon as possible.
5. International assistance shall be sought.
6. A constitutional framework for the peace agreement and the institutions referred to above shall be established (CPA 2005).
In January 2005, the Naivasha Accord formally ended the North- South war with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
Details of the CPA:
THE SIX PROTOCOLS OF THE CPA, 2002-2004
v The Protocol of Machakos The Machakos Protocol signed on 20 July 2002 was hailed as a major step towards peace (as it was a framework for future discussions about peace), resolving the issue of self determination and state and religion (CPA 2005)
v The Protocol on Security Arrangements, signed on 23 September 2003, established a joint force for the military and articulated ceasefire arrangements (CPA 2005)
v The Protocol on Wealth Sharing, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004, outlined the division of natural resources within the nation (CPA 2005)
The Protocol on Power Sharing, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004, explicitly outlined a new government structure (CPA 2005)
v The Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004, discussed the inclusion of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile states in the CPA and formulated options for self government for these regions (CPA 2005)
v The Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei, signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004, discussed the inclusion of Abyei state in the CPA and formulated options for oil-sharing for the nation (CPA 2005)
DARFUR REGION CRISIS
Source: Produced by Reliefweb, 12 April 2004, and reproduced on the DFID website, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/DFIDAroundWorld/africa/darfurmap.
Darfur is a region in Western Sudan, the vast majority of is black and Muslim. It occupies one fifth of the area of Sudan comprising approximately 250,000 square kilometers. It is larger than Egypt and equals the area of France. It borders Libya to the north-west, Chad to the west, and the Central African Republic to the south-west. It is home to 6 million people, and dozens of different ethnic groups. From a subsistence point of view, they could be divided into livestock herders-who for the most part are Arabic speakers-and farmers-who are bilingual and perceived as Africans.16 The most important divisions in terms of understanding the conflict in Darfur are farmers and the so-called "Arab" nomadic herders, ably backed by the government in Khartoum
6.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR: Open conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equity Movement took advantage of the turmoil within the Al- basher regime and launched attacks on government military bases. A series of rebel success ensued during the first half of 2003 before government regrouped and responded with a counter insurgency campaign. The Government backed Janjaweed militia fighters carried out raids on communities suspected of aiding or sympathizing with the rebels and it is humanitarian impact of these attacks which forms the core of the present crisis in Darfur. Observers have reported evidence of close coordination between the government and the Janjaweed, with the latter receiving not only money and guns, but also air support from Sudanese fighter jets which bombed villages in preparation for militia raids. Claims have also been made of rape and killings of civilians by the militias. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people are believed to have died in the conflict thus far, although no reliable available figures have been collated. Out of a pre- conflict population in Darfur of between 4 and 7 million, as many as 1.3 million are believed to have fled their houses and are displaced within Sudan. Another 250,000 refugees are said to be in neighbouring Chad. By late 2006, the Janjaweed had destroyed over 2,000 villages in Darfur.
In September 2004, the United States finally labeled the atrocities “genocide”. That same month, the European Union (E.U), declared that the Sudanese government actions were tantamount to “genocide” and threatened to impose sanction. This classification was important because under the United Nations guidelines, countries have a duty to interfere to stop genocide.
6.2 ISSUES IN CONTENTION IN DARFUR
DISPUTE OVER IDENTITY:
The war in the Darfur region is fought over identity as a result of the policy of the government of Sudan to Arabize the Darfur people who are mainly Black Africans. It is known that people have gone into conflict when their collective ego, dignity or ethnic group is threatened. That of Darfur is no exception. Darfur has always had an uneasy relationship with the Khartoum-centered state because of its history. According to Douglas Johnson (2003), Darfur “was site of independent sultanates until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the late 1870s, it rallied early to the Mahdiyya in the 1880s, and subsequently fostered a counter-Mahdiyya opposition when control from Omdurman became too oppressive. The sultanate briefly revived itself after the overthrow of the Mahdist state by Anglo-Egyptian forces, and maintained an independent existence until its final conquest and incorporation into the Sudan in 1916. Overwhelmingly Muslim, Darfur is not predominantly Arab”. The need for a separate identity by the Black Africans in Darfur region induced the revolt against the Arabization policy and the war in the region. The words of Mohammed Baraka Mohammed, a former Minister in Sudan’s Parliament and a Darfurian in 2007, lay credence to this assertion. In his words, “These tribes are viewed with contempt such as my tribe, the Fur. When I was at school, I was beaten if I didn't speak Arabic even though my tribe has its own language. This and other forms of "forced Arabization" suggest the disrespect with which we are viewed”.
SUPPORT TO MILITIAS GROUPS BY THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT:
One of the reasons that has been advanced for why the conflict in the Darfur region has remained unresolved, is the fact that the Sudanese government has continued to follow a policy of supporting ethnic militias, especially the Janjaweed, coordinating or tolerating attacks on civilians and permitting serious violations of international law to go unpunished-including attacks on African Union Forces and humanitarian aid workers and their convoys.
The support given to the ethnic militias by the government in Khartoum emboldened them to continue in their nefarious acts.
THE CONTINUING CONFLICT AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE REBEL GROUPS:
At the commencement of the Darfur crisis in 2003, there were two main major rebel groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). As at today, there are over a dozen rebel groups who have splintered into a confusing array of competing factions, some of which have launched a surge of violence as disparate groups. For instance the SLA/SLM has broken into factions like SLM-Minni Minnawi Faction; SLM-Adel Wahid Faction; SLM Classic (Shafi) Faction; SLM Unity Faction of Abdallah Yehya. Other splinter groups of SLA/SLM are: Free Will; the Greater Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; and the National Movement for the Elimination of Marginalization. On the other hand, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is reputed to have fragmented into several disparate groups, of which the most significant is the National Movement for Reform and Development led by Jubril Abdel Karim Bari. Other splinter groups of JEM are: JEM Peace Wing; Field Revolutionary Command and Popular Forces Troops; and the National Redemption Front. All this rebel groups have splinted along ethnic lines and their activities have really undermined the efforts of the international community to bring peace to Darfur, as the leaderships of most of them have shunned and refused to sign the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) aimed at bringing solution to the crisis.
FAILURE TO HONOUR THE TERMS OF DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT:
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 5, 2006 was meant to resolve the crisis between the rebel groups and the Khartoum government. But only a faction of SLA headed by Minni Minawi signed the DPA, with other rebel movements, JEM and the SLA faction lead by Abdulwahid Mohamed Nour, refusing to sign, thus putting the DPA on uncertain footing from the start. According to Human Rights Watch, rebel leaders rejected the DPA because it failed to sufficiently address key issues including a victim’s compensation fund, power-sharing, rebel representation in government and the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias. And ever since the DPA was signed, fighting in Darfur has increased between the government and “non-signatory” rebel groups. There has also been a surge in fighting among rebel factions (largely in North Darfur). The rebels refused to sign the DPA and they continue to fight the government, which has launched an offensive against them.
THE STRUGGLE OVER RESOURCES:
One other factor which has remained constant and cited in the Darfur crisis is the struggle for the control of resources, most especially, land and water. Darfur is inhabited by six million people, drawn from some eighty different tribes and ethnic groups. From a subsistence point of view, they could be divided into livestock herders-who for the most part are Arabic speakers-and farmers-who are bilingual and perceived as Africans. Over the years, ecological and demographic transformation had a negative impact on inter-tribal relations where drought and desertification, according to Ambassador Khidir Haroun Ahmed (2005), “led to conflicts and often violence over scarce resources”. During the 1970s and 1980s these tribal conflicts became more intense and bloody, especially between the farmers and cattle herders who in search of water and pasture invaded agricultural land. Adding to the complexity of the situation is the increased migration of nomadic groups from Chad, Libya and other states. The need to have access to land and other limited scarce resources in Darfur has made the inhabitants to continually wage wars against themselves.
6.3 CONFLICT DIMENSION OF DARFUR
According to a UN estimate, at least 200,000 people have died in the Darfur conflict. Some estimates put the death toll closer to 400,000. Civilians have accounted for the majority of casualties as victims of violence, starvation, and disease. More than 2 million Darfurians have been displaced from their homes. They have sought refuge in desolate makeshift camps in Darfur or across the border in Chad. With one-third of the entire population of Darfur living in overcrowded refugee camps, the conflict poses a dire humanitarian emergency. Refugees rely almost entirely on international relief efforts for their survival. However, the Sudanese government has placed tight controls on the activity of relief workers. In addition, the pervasive lack of safety in rural areas has severely restricted access to many Needy Communities. The civilian population suffered atrocities such as the destruction of entire villages, the slaughter of inhabitants, the widespread rape of women, and the contamination of water wells. In 2004 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the government and Janjaweed in Darfur as genocide.
REGIONAL DIMENSIONS
Because of the tribal overlapping between Darfur and Chad, the Chadian conflict also had an influence on the social structure in Darfur (Roland 2006). In fact, three presidents of Chad, and most recently Idriss Déby, entered the palace of N’Djamena through a Darfur-based insurgency. Alsayed Abdullah Abtar, the first commander of the Darfur Liberation Front – which sparked the first rebellion in 2003 – was one of the leaders of a successful attack launched in Darfur in 1990 and also led Idriss Déby to take power in Chad. Likewise, the conflict in Southern Sudan, which is frequently regarded as a liberation struggle under the leadership of the late John Garang, has influenced the inhabitants of Darfur. The SLM enter the region from the Central African Republic (CAR) in order to put more pressure on the government in Khartoum. The regional element adds a new dimension to the conflict in Darfur, because it contributes to the ease with which weapons can be obtained, inhabitants can learn how to use them, and fighters can be trained. In view of the political instability in the countries neighbouring Sudan – especially those adjacent to Darfur – western Sudan is used as a base in proxy wars. Armed Chadian militias maintain, support and deploy troops in Darfur and the Darfur rebel forces maintain close relations with the Chadian government, which provides them with shelter and arms. President Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, is in a state of open warfare with the regime of President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan (Haggar 2007). In late January 2008, the ruling regime in N’Djamena was the subject of a devastating attack by rebel Chadian forces which besieged President Déby in his palace. Although this military operation failed because of military and logistical reasons and because France sided with President Déby, it soured Chadian/Sudanese relations. Sudan for example accused the Chadian government of being behind the failed assault attempt against Omdurman in May 2008, which had been launched by JEM forces headed by Khalil Ibrahim. The unstable situation in the CAR has in turn contributed to the armed conflict that has spread across the region into Chad and Sudan. After the CAR attained independence from France in 1960, the country suffered consecutive coups culminating in the advent of Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1965, who ruled as emperor until he was deposed by French troops in 1979. Instability and a weak centralized power structure were the most obvious features of Bokassa’s regime and contributed to the ease of movement of weapons and rebels across the CAR to and from neighbouring regions.
It is noteworthy that Libya plays a pivotal role in attempts to settle the conflict in Darfur and that it has hosted the peace process. Libya has also appealed, more than once, to adversaries not to turn the crisis in Darfur into an international political conflict. Nigeria, too, embraced the Darfur peace negotiations in 2006 and has provided Eritrea with material and logistical support in support of its unceasing attempts to consolidate all opposing parties to this accord. Egypt is interested in Sudanese affairs in general, but its role does not go beyond supporting the Sudanese position and demanding a peaceful settlement of the crisis. The Egyptian position perhaps reflects the official Arab stance, which the Arab League has expressed in general terms. In general there is no doubt that the conflict in Darfur has altered and reconfigured regional interactions between neighbouring Arab and African countries, with every regional party attempting to influence the events of this conflict to further its own interests. A strong indicator is the African Union’s attempts, from the onset of the conflict in Darfur, to see it as an ‘African problem’ requiring an ‘African solution’ (Murithi 2005). The AU dispatched peacekeeping forces to the region in 2004 – these were transformed in late December 2007 into a hybrid UN and AU force (in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007).
THE ROLE OF CHINA
China has limited presence in Darfur, it was given rights to work on the Inqaz al-Gharbi Highway [from Khartoum to Darfur], to dig several water-wells, and a number of oil exploration rights. China entered Darfur from the "door of development" to convince the world of its role and that it is not simply as an ally of the Sudanese government or that it doesn’t care about Darfur. China’s interests in Sudan as a whole however are strong. China participates in %50 of the oil projects, it participates in funding roads and bridges projects and trade with China is booming. Sudan has taken China’s interests into Africa, so Sudan has become an important country on the African map for China.
China also is a major supplier if arms to the GoS. As a result of the partnership with Sudan, China refuses to veto the deployment of UNAMID to Darfur. It took threats from the USA before China could respond.
6.4 CHRONOLOGY OF THE DARFUR PEACE PROCESS:
The government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army signed the first six weeks ceasefire mediated by President Idris Derby of Chad in September 2003 in Abeche and agreed to allow free and unimpeded humanitarian access within Darfur.
Inspite of the agreement, the government of Sudan continued to bolster their military apparatus with additional trainings, weapons and combat support structures and extended its attacks further afield.
The attention of the international community was in part distracted by the Peace Negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLA. This of course allowed the GOS to escalate militarily in Darfur without fear or repercussion (IGC 2004).
The government of Chad again in 2004, assisted by the African Union (parties to the agreement) mediated between the GOS, Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equity Movement. This happened after considerable international pressure. A humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was signed on the 8th of April 2004. The parties also agreed on a protocol for establishing humanitarian assistance. With increased international pressure and following visits of then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan and then US Secretary for State Collin Powel from June 29th to 2nd of July 2004, the conflict decreased considerably.
In December, 2004, in Abuja the fourth round of the Darfur Peace Talks took place. The fifth round of peace talks was held in June, September and in October the sixth round of peace talks.
The seventh and final round of the Abuja peace talks began on November 29, 2005. The Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Army was present at the negotiations. Initial progress was extremely slow and during the final two weeks considerable international pressure to bear.
On 5 May 2006: The Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi (SLA–MM) and the Sudanese government sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja; SLA–Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA–AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) do not. It called for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army.
Limited support for the agreement and a failure to sell (or Even explain) it to civil society, Darfur’s Arabs, and the masses in the displaced camps, plus scant attention to implementation as insecurity deepens, condemn it to irrelevance. A decision to seek wider support by allowing splinter groups to sign Declarations of Commitment backfires, encouraging factional splits and divide-and rule tactics. In September United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Jan Pronk will tell the UN Security Council: ‘In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time. Not to get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties.’ The accord was orchestrated by then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, Salim Ahmed Salim (working on behalf of the African Union), AU representatives, and other foreign officials operating in Abuja, Nigeria.
16 November 2006: The African Union (AU) and UN decide to‘re-energize’ the peace process by organizing talks between the government and non-signatories. Tanzania’s Salim Ahmed Salim, chief mediator in Abuja, and Jan Eliasson, a former Swedish foreign minister, are appointed joint mediators for the AU and UN, respectively.
8 June 2007: The mediators announce a three-phase ‘road map’ that consists of aligning regional initiatives; uniting the rebel movements; and then holding new talks.
In July 2007, Chad, Eritrea, and Libya agree to coordinate with the ‘hybrid’ mediation and phase one is declared a success. The hybrid mission ends in failure: it does not create a genuine consensus among neighbouring states, did not bring all the armed movements on board, and does not restrain the parties on the battlefield.
August 2007: From 3 August 2007 until 5 August 2007, a conference was held in Arusha, Tanzania, to unite the different existing rebel groups to make the subsequent peace negotiations with the government of Sudan more streamlined. The rebel leaders aimed to unify their positions and demands, which included compensation for the victims and autonomy for Darfur. They eventually reached agreement on joined demands, including power and wealth sharing, security, land and humanitarian issues.
October 2007 Peace talks started on 27 October 2007 in Sirte, Libya. The meeting was facilitated by the Libyan government and AU. The following groups attended the talks:
- Justice and Equality Movement splinters:
- Justice and Equality Movement–Collective Leadership, led by Bahr Idris Abu Garda
- Justice and Equality Movement–Azraq, led by Idris Ibrahim Azraq
- National Movement for Reform and Development, led by Khalil Abdullah
- Revolutionary Democratic Forces Front, led by Salah Abu Surrah
- United Revolutionary Force Front, led by Alhadi Agabeldour
- Sudan Liberation Movement–G19, led by Khamees Abdullah
- Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, led by Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige
The following groups didn't attend:
Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim; they object to the presence of rebel groups they say had no constituency and no place at the table.
· Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdel Wahed), led by Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur; the group has few forces, but its leader is highly respected; refused to attend until a force was deployed to stem the Darfur violence.
· Sudan Liberation Movement–Unity, originally led by Abdallah Yehya, the group with the largest number of rebel fighters; object for the same reason as JEM.
Faced with a boycott from the most important rebel factions, the talks were rebranded as an "advanced consultation phase". Nothing concrete came out of the talks.
November 2007 : Nine rebel groups — six SLM factions, the Democratic Popular Front, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the Justice and Equality Movement–Field Revolutionary Command — signed a Charter of Unification and agreed to operate under the name of SLM/A. It was announced that Darfur's rebel movements had united into two large groups and were now ready to negotiate in an orderly structure with the government.
30 June 2008: Djibril Bassolé of Burkina Faso is appointed chief mediator for the peace process, representing both the AU and UN.
9 September 2008: A League of Arab States resolution proposes that Qatar should host new peace talks. The UN acquiesces, needing a sponsor for the talks, and Bassolé begins working alongside Qatar’s minister for foreign affairs, Sheikh Ahmed bin Abdalla al-Mahmoud.
16 October 2008 : With the International Criminal Court (ICC) demanding that President Omar al Bashir stand trial for genocide, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) organizes the Sudan People’s Initiative to provide ‘national’ solutions to the Darfur conflict. The conference, in Khartoum, is attended by most main political parties and, unusually, civil society, but internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not represented. The government agrees to incorporate the movements’ demands for compensation and a single Darfur region into its negotiating position at future talks. But the initiative stalls as efforts to defer the prosecution of the president fail and the mediation and Western nations show no interest.
February 2009: The government and JEM sit down together, in Doha, for the first time since June 2007. On 17 February, they sign a goodwill agreement that combines a ceasefire with a commitment to exchange prisoners and facilitate the delivery of aid. The agreement stalls over the sequencing of the ceasefire and prisoner releases.
15 March 2009: Libya, chair of the AU for the coming year, convinces five factions— SLA–Unity, SLA–Khamis Abaker, the United Resistance Front, Democratic JEM, and SLA–Juba—to join the Doha process.
18 March 2009: US President Barack Obama names Scott Gration, a retired Air Force general, as his special envoy to Sudan. Reflecting concern over the lack of Fur representation in Doha, Gration prioritizes unifying Fur commanders who are critical of SLA–AW and its refusal of negotiations until security is restored and the government-supported militias popularly known as ‘Janjaweed’ are disarmed.
20 March 2009: JEM suspends talks with the government, citing Khartoum’s expulsion of 13 international relief agencies in response to the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
13 July 2009: JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim threatens to pull out of the Doha talks if mediators invite other insurgents.
August 2009: Almost a dozen rebel factions coalesce into two groups—the ‘Addis Ababa
Group’ (otherwise known as the ‘road map group’) formed by Gration and the ‘Tripoli group’ formed by Libya. JEM dismisses most as ‘Internet groups’, insists that they join JEM if they want representation in Doha, and regrets that ‘some birds are trying to move away from the flock’. The talks stalled.
7 November 2009: The ‘Tripoli group’, renamed SLA–Revolutionary Forces, declines an invitation to Doha, prioritizing rebel unity. The Doha talks, due to begin on 16 November after an eight-month hiatus, are postponed indefinitely.
6–19 November 2009: With other tracks stalled, civil society representatives are invited to Doha—for the first time since the peace process began in Abuja in 2004. JEM and SLA–AW condemn the meeting, alleging that most of the representatives are NCP sympathizers. The ‘Doha Declaration’ issued at the end of the meeting does not bear out this claim: it calls for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations; justice and an end to impunity; settlement of land disputes, including the return of all IDPs to their villages; and the evacuation of settlers. Follow-up talks with civil society and the armed movements are scheduled for January 2010. JEM rejects them.
26 December 2009: Sudan and Chad agree to enforce border controls on each other’s armed opposition movements. Within days, Darfur-based Chadian rebels move back from the border.
23 February 2010: Squeezed by the rapprochement between N’Djaména and Khartoum, JEM moves its fighters out of Chad and into Darfur and signs a ‘framework agreement’ with Khartoum in Doha. The agreement has only two operative paragraphs—for a ceasefire and a prisoner release—but sets an agenda for substantive talks, to include a permanent ceasefire, the future status of JEM combatants, compensation, and power-sharing at all levels of government. Qatar offers a sweetener: nearly USD 1 billion for development in Darfur.
Ten factions in the Addis Ababa and Tripoli groups unite under the name of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) for the purposes of negotiation. (Their military commands, such as they are, remain separate.) They choose as leader Tijani Sese, a widely respected Fur politician and former governor of Darfur who has lived abroad for 20 years. The mediation hopes Sese will win Fur support for the peace process, especially in the IDP camps. JEM snubs him, saying he has no history in the rebellion. Government troops and planes attack SLA–AW positions in Jebel Marra in the wake of heavy intra-rebel fighting as part of which SLA–AW seeks help both from JEM and government-backed militias.
3 March 2010: JEM threatens to leave Doha if there are ‘multiple agreements’.
18 March 2010: Disregarding JEM, the LJM and the Sudanese government sign a framework agreement
.
26 March 2010: Khalil Ibrahim travels to Doha to demand the expulsion of the LJM. The state-run Sudan Media Centre accuses JEM of violating the ceasefire 23 times in one month.
April 2010: The government intensifies its offensive against JEM, claiming it has moved out of four agreed locations. JEM scatters its forces. Fighting spreads.
2 May 2010: JEM freezes its participation in Doha, citing ‘continuous aerial and ground assaults’.
8 May 2010: Meeting in Addis Ababa, the Sudan Consultative Forum1 introduces a distinction between the peace process and the political process. The peace process is between the belligerents, for a ceasefire and a political settlement; the political process is a wider initiative that would address all issues—including reconciliation and accountability. With Bassolé’s term due to expire in June, African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) chief Ibrahim Gambari wants an All Darfur Conference under UNAMID auspices, with a continuing strong Qatari role to guarantee development money for Darfur.
10 May 2010: Justice Minister Abdel Basit Sabderat says the Sudanese government has asked Interpol to arrest Khalil Ibrahim to face 14 charges including murder and waging war against the state.
15 May 2010: Government forces occupy Jebel Moon, JEM’s stronghold in north-western Darfur. JEM claims it has already expanded into other parts of Darfur and Kordofan.
19 May 2010: Khalil Ibrahim flies into Chad from Libya, aiming to travel overland to Darfur, but is detained at N’Djaména airport for 19 hours before being sent back to Libya. Sudan asks neighbouring states not to give him haven. JEM and government forces fight in South Darfur, with heavy casualties on both sides.
25 May 2010: In a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, JEM says the Sudan government is seeking a military solution to the conflict. It alleges that the Doha process is only ‘for public relations business and image improvement’. Demanding ‘radical reform’ of the Doha forum, JEM says it will not negotiate under ‘intimidation and menace’. Presidential adviser Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani, in charge of Darfur’s political file for the government, says Khartoum is ‘not concerned and not interested in the positions of the Justice and Equality Movement, especially as it has no real desire to negotiate for peace.’
27 May 2010: JEM and SLA–AW clash with government forces around Deribat in eastern
Jebel Marra. A JEM official says privately that ‘JEM will do whatever possible to keep Jebel Marra free or in hands other than the government and the “Janjaweed”’.
30 May 2010: Bassolé tells Khalil Ibrahim that UNAMID cannot fly him from Libya to Darfur without Khartoum’s permission. JEM makes its presence in Doha contingent upon its commanders’ ability to return to Darfur, where, by UN count, 440 people died in May in fighting between government forces and JEM. UN Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes says the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is hostage to the lack of progress in Doha.
5 June: President Bashir says that following the April elections, ‘the current Doha round will be the last for any armed group. There will be no legitimacy through the gun—only through the ballot box.’
6 June 2010: Talks between the government and the LJM resume in Doha, after a two month break for elections. The backdrop is not auspicious: the February 2009 ceasefire has collapsed—with fresh government offensives against JEM and SLA– AW in May causing the largest number of recorded violent fatalities in Darfur since the arrival of UNAMID in January 2008—and JEM is refusing further negotiation. Four smaller factions also boycott the round: the original SLA–Unity, Democratic JEM, the United Revolutionary Front Forces (URFF), and a group of commanders including Ali Haroun Dud, Abdalla Khalil, and Babiker Abdalla, who left SLA– AW—in part over Abdul Wahid’s rejection of negotiations. The commanders resent mediation pressure on them to join the LJM, which they consider an artificial creation that will not respond to the needs of Darfurians—and especially the Fur—and want to unite Fur dissidents under a separate umbrella. URFF leader Ibrahim al Zubaidi accuses the mediation of lacking neutrality.
14 June 2010: Khalil Ibrahim says ‘Doha is over’ and warns that an agreement between the government and the LJM that excludes the two original movements, JEM and SLA– AW, will not bring peace. He cites the DPA as an example.
24 June 2010: The government and the LJM begin talks on wealth sharing. The mediation’s timetable requires a number of protocols to be finalized by the end of July, despite the absence of the main movements and the breakdown of the ceasefire.
29 June 2010: The government and movements meet with civil society representatives, for the first time, in the framework of discussions on compensation and the return of refugees and IDPs. The government bans leaders of Kalma IDP camp, one of the most deadly militant in Darfur, from travelling to Doha. The LJM threatens to walk out.
30 June 2010: Speaking in Port Sudan on the 21st anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, President Bashir says: ‘Whoever wants peace should go to Doha. Whoever wants something else will be taught a lesson they will never forget.’
5 July 2010 : The US and British special envoys are absent from a meeting for international envoys called by UNAMID chief Ibrahim Gambari in al Fasher to review ‘the Darfur political process, including the way forward to help Darfurians and all the people of the Sudan achieve lasting peace’. The scheduling of the meeting so close to US Independence Day celebrations on 4 July and only two weeks before special envoys meet in Khartoum under the auspices of the Consultative Forum is widely criticized, with Mbeki suggesting a two-week postponement, which Gambari refused. The divided and acrimonious international environment continues to contribute to the Darfurians’ lack of confidence in any mediation process.
8 July 2010: Under military pressure in Jebel Marra, Abdul Wahid meets Qatari officials in Paris but reiterates his refusal to go to Doha until security is restored in Darfur. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who had reportedly been considering asking the rebel leader to leave France, says this marks an important step forward in the peace process.
12 July 2010: The second civil society forum opens in Doha, overshadowed by new tensions within civil society that complicate a proposal to hold ‘broad-based and inclusive political consultations inside Darfur’ to provide ‘structured popular input into the Doha negotiations during June–August’. The consultations are necessary, the mediation says in a strategy document, to ‘give particular focus to those communities whose support of any agreements is critical for their durability, in particular newly elected officials, IDPs, and Arab communities’.
15 July 2010: Civil society delegates, including IDP representatives, call for Darfur to be reorganized as a single administrative region. The chief government negotiator, Amin Hassan Omer, questions the delegates’ right to speak for Darfurians; delegates question the government’s commitment to peace and express concern over reports that it intends to launch a parallel initiative inside Darfur. They believe that any ‘domestic’ initiative will be subject to government manipulation, bribery, and coercion, and fear that Western nations seeking Khartoum’s cooperation in peaceful Southern secession after the referendum will be unwilling to exert pressure to rein in government abuses in Darfur. The talks adjourn until mid-September.
23 August 2010: Vice-President Ali Osman Taha announces USD 1.9 billion worth of recovery and development projects to support ‘domestication’. The projects include the completion of the Western Salvation Road linking Darfur to Khartoum, planned for the past two decades but bedeviled by conflict and corruption.
26 August 2010: After meeting with Ghazi Attabani in Cairo, the AU, UNAMID, and the United States give unqualified support to Sudan’s new peace strategy. The Arab League follows five days later.
16 September 2010: The Sudanese cabinet endorses the strategy, stressing the importance of collecting illegal arms and punishing law-breakers. Previous disarmament efforts have focused on non-Arabs.
8 October 2010: Negotiations between the government and LJM resume in Doha, with the parties considering a draft agreement assembled by a third party (the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). The deadline for agreement—19 October—recalls the failed ‘deadline diplomacy’ of the last days of Abuja. Bassolé meets with Abdul Wahid in Paris and Ibrahim Khalil in Libya, acknowledging that ‘without the participation of these movements besides the Sudanese government, LJM, and civil society, peace will remain fragile and unstable’.
19 October 2010: With security and power-sharing issues resisting consensus, the first
Doha deadline passes and is extended—by a week.
23 October 2010: JEM announces it will send a delegation to meet Bassolé in Doha, but says it will return to the negotiating table only as part of a single ‘resistance’ group.
6 November 2010: Bassolé presents a plan to conclude Doha by 19 December at the Sudan consultative forum meeting in Addis Ababa. At the same time he predicts that the fighting will continue.
7 November 2010: President Bashir holds talks with the joint mediators in Doha. The LJM says it will not compromise on the issue of a single region and demands a vice-presidency for Darfur.
11 November 2010: Bassolé asks for another extension of the process—into 2011 apparently believing there is a chance of convincing JEM to approve a final document alongside the LJM.
13–14 November 2010: As Khartoum accuses the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of aiding JEM and launches air raids across Darfur’s southern border, just inside South Sudan, a JEM delegation holds two days of talks with mediators in Doha. The delegation is headed, for the first time, by a non-Darfurian—Mohamed Bahr Hamadein, JEM’s deputy chairman and a member of the Missiriya tribe from Kordofan. The appointment shows the new interest JEM has in areas bordering Darfur as government troops target JEM fighters in Darfur.
1 December 2010: Angry students shouting ‘Bassolé is a foreign agent’ stone mediators during a tour of Darfur marred by violence and protests.
3 December 2010: The army declares SLA–MM a legitimate military target two weeks after a senior NCP official accuses Minawi of moving to Juba to seek Southern support for a new rebellion. An army spokesman says ‘a large portion of Minawi’s forces are moving towards the South’ with weapons and vehicles. The bank accounts of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) headed by Minawi are frozen. On day later, Minawi cadres are arrested in al Fasher and Nyala, and vehicles seized in Khartoum. Two days later, Minawi is removed from the TDRA by presidential decree.
10 December 2010: Government forces attack Khor Abeche, 80 km south of Nyala. Minawi says the DPA is dead.
12 December 2010: In a meeting in London, seven small factions announce another coalition—the Charter of Sudanese Alliance Resistance Forces in Darfur—with JEM. The seven groups are the United Revolutionary Forces Front; the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Babiker Abdalla,
who died in January 2011 after a long illness; a Libyan-supported LJM splinter led by Mahgoub Hussein; the United Resistance Front; the mainly Masalit Sudan Liberation Movement splinter led by Khamis Abaker; the Democratic Revolutionary Forces Front; and the Democratic Justice and Equality Movement of Idris Azraq, a splinter of JEM that has accused JEM of tribalism, nepotism, and corruption. The alliance is seen as a Libyan-supported attempt to counter the LJM’s claim to represent a broad spread of Darfur opinion. With the exception of JEM, it has little military strength. It is not expected to have any political or military impact.
26 December 2010: JEM meets mediators on the sidelines of the talks in Doha, returning to Doha for the first time in seven months.
29 December 2010: Ghazi Attabani says Khartoum is withdrawing its delegation from Doha because ‘negotiating in the conventional manner’ is not helpful. JEM, which has boycotted most of the Doha process, calls the withdrawal ‘a declaration of war’.
30 December 2010: The mediation hands the two parties proposals to end the deadlock, including over the administrative status of Darfur, participation in the institution of the presidency, compensation and justice. The package includes a regional authority and vice presidency for Darfur. Khartoum rejects the proposals as being inconsistent with the constitution and the framework agreement already signed in Doha.
31 December 2010: Ghazi Attabani and his team leave Doha to prepare for a political process inside Darfur.
January 2011, the leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement, Dr Tijani Sese, stated that the movement had accepted the core proposals of the Darfur peace document proposed by the joint-mediators in Doha. The proposals include a $300,000,000 compensation package for victims of atrocities in Darfur and special courts to conduct trials of persons accused of human rights violations. Proposals for a new Darfur Regional Authority were also included; this authority would have an executive council of 18 ministers and would remain in place for five years. The current three Darfur states and state governments would also continue to exist during this period. In February 2011, the Sudanese Government rejected the idea of a single region headed by a vice-president from the region.
29 January 2011, the leaders of the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement issued a joint statement stating their commitment to the Doha negotiations and agreed to attend the Doha forum on 5 February 2011. The Sudanese government initially withheld decision whether to attend the forum on that date due to beliefs an internal peace process without involvement of rebel groups might be possible. Later in February 2011, the Sudanese Government agreed to return to the Doha peace forum with a view to complete a new peace agreement by the end
3 February 2011: Minni Minawi formally withdraws from the DPA, declaring that he ‘will work by all means to overthrow’ the Khartoum government.
5 February 2011: AU peace and security commissioner Ramtane Lamamra says the mediation is aiming to have a Darfur agreement ready to sign by July, when South Sudan is due to become independent.
10 February 2011: The Sudanese government says it will send a ‘limited’ delegation back to Doha to review compromise proposals drafted by the mediation.
18 February 2011: A JEM delegation travels to Kenya to meet Abdul Wahid. The two sides agree to hold talks on working together, possibly as early as mid-March. Meeting in Nyala amid heavy fighting between government and rebel forces, special envoys from more than half a dozen countries including the US, China, and Russia agree that talks with Darfurians other than the movements— the Darfur Political Process or DPP—will open in Darfur only when the Doha process is complete, with or without a signed agreement. (The NCP and AUHIP had agreed in January that the DPP would begin in February and would not be delayed by lack of agreement in Doha.)
23 February 2011: The mediation hands the parties new proposals on outstanding areas of disagreement.
25 February 2011: JEM and the LJM reject the new proposals. JEM says they do not meet even the minimum demands of the movements, including a single region and a vice presidency for Darfur.
28 February 2011: JEM asks the UN to rescue Khalil Ibrahim from Libya and says it is willing to resume negotiations in Doha. of that month. On 25 February 2011, both the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement announced that they have now rejected the peace document proposed by the mediators in Doha. The main sticking points were the issue of a Darfuri vice-president and compensation for victims. The Sudanese government has not commented on the peace document.
2 March 2011: Having failed to convince the mediation to wind up the talks by 15 March and hand over to the DPP, Ghazi Salahuddin announces the government’s plans to hold a referendum on the administrative status of Darfur, previously a focus of effort in Doha, within three months. JEM calls the initiative ‘yet another attempt to undermine the efforts of the mediation’ to pave the way for a domestic process under NCP control; the LJM says the announcement is tantamount to ‘the abolition of the negotiations’. The two movements form a joint committee to establish a unified position on the issue.
5 March 2011: Speaking for the pro-government bloc of Darfur parliamentarians in the National Assembly, Hassabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman proposes further division of the region, with two new states in Jebel Marra (capital Zalingei) and Bahr al Arab (capital al Daein). The government quickly endorses the proposal, raising the possibility of a five-state region rather than the single region the armed movements say is the prerequisite for any peace agreement. Ghazi Salahudin says the parliamentarians’ proposal was adopted because it represents ‘the will of the people of Darfur’. Citing the DPA, he says there is a ‘legal obligation’ on the government to hold the referendum by April.
March 2011, it was announced that two more states would be established in Darfur: Central Darfur around Zalingei and Eastern Darfur around Ed Daein. The presidential decree making this official has not yet been released. The rebel groups protested and stated that this was a bid to further divide Darfur's influence.
Advising both the LJM and JEM during the Doha peace negotiations is the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG). Lead by Dr. Paul Williams and Matthew T. Simpson, PILPG's team has provided on the ground legal support with regard to the substantive issues in the peace process.
10 March 2011: In a joint press statement, JEM and the LJM announce agreement to cooperate and coordinate in the peace process. They inform the mediation they are also coordinating efforts to bring Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi into a single platform. The government delegation in Doha, until now scathing of rebel disunity, says the announcement undoes the progress already made with the LJM. Amin Hassan Omer warns the movements that the government has ‘other keys’ to end the conflict in Darfur.
13 March 2011: Seeking a success to strengthen its case for the continuation of the Doha process, the mediation proposes that the parties adopt the four chapters they agree on—Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Justice and Reconciliation, Compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees, and Wealth Sharing—and keep talking about the remaining disputed issues, including the administrative status of Darfur.
21 March 2011: A UNAMID delegation headed by Gambari meets Abdul Wahid in Kampala. SLA-AW announces an initiative—identical to that already announced by JEM—to unite all armed movements, to build ‘a state of citizenship and democracy’. After the meeting, UNAMID officials express hope that Abdul Wahid may soon travel to Doha. In Doha, the mediators announce an ‘all Darfur stakeholders’ conference’, reportedly of some 400 people, to be held 18 April. They invite government officials, representatives of the armed movements, civil society groups, IDPs and refugees’ representatives, tribal leaders, political forces, and regional and international partners. Speaking privately, government officials say the meeting is an attempt to force Khartoum to bow to the movements’ demand for a single region, and they reject it. Co-chaired by the African Union (AU) and the UN, the forum brings together Sudan, the Inter- Governmental Authority for Development, the League of Arab States, AU partners, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, and other relevant bilateral partners to support implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the North–South war (HSBA 2011).
June 2011, a new Darfur Peace Agreement was proposed by the Joint Mediators at the Doha Peace Forum. This agreement will supersede the Abuja Agreement of 2005. The proposed document included provisions for a Darfuri Vice-President and an administrative structure that includes both three states and a strategic regional authority, the Darfur Regional Authority, to oversee Darfur as a whole. The agreement includes 7 main chapters top of which are the human rights, basic freedoms, power sharing, the administrative status of Darfur region, wealth sharing, return of the displaced persons and the refugees, reconciliation, cease fire, the security arrangements and mechanism of dialogue and implementation. The agreement has approved establishment of a transitional power. The agreement also approved conduct of supervision to guarantee proper implementation of the peace agreement. The agreement gave due concern to the social development issue. It allocated 225 million dollars to implement development projects in the region. The donors have made serious pledges this time to fulfill their promises in this respect.
14 of July 2011, the signing of the Doha Peace Agreement and a referendum for the status of Darfur has been fixed for July 2012.
7 HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION THAT TOOK PLACE AMIDST THE CONFLICT?
On paper it can be said that the bargaining was successful, in the sense that it produced the CPA for the case of North/ South crisis and the DPA the case of the North/ Darfur and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreements. No doubt that there is a consensus among different observers that the Doha peace agreement on Darfur is an advanced peace agreement with regard to its items, goals and mechanisms. It is expected that the peace agreement of Doha will put an end to the Darfur crisis in Western Sudan. Also it is believed that since the CPA took into consideration several peace accords signed over the years, the negotiators and conflict parties are fully aware of the pitfalls in the previous negotiations. With a firm grasp of the issues in contention it is expected that the agreements will be satisfactory to all parties concerned.
However, from the practical angle the position of this group is different. Violence, human right abuses and the activities of armed militias are still prevalent. Inspite of the agreements, there are still tensions between Khartoum, Southern Sudan and Darfur. In some cases, there are violent skirmishes.
Prior to the referendum in the South, the July 2007 deadline for the withdrawal of government troops passed without any national or international response.
The face off between Arab militias and the SPLA continued in the oil Abyei region on the North- South border which had been granted special administration status by the CPA.
In March 2008, inspite of the CPA, the SPLA and the government of Sudan renewed hostilities, displacing100, 000 people from the Abyei region. Amidst fears of a return to full scale civil war, in June, both parties signed the Abyei Roadmap, which called for the deployment of a joint military force and submission of the Abyei border dispute to The Hague based Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
In 2009, the PCA ruling called for a redrawing of the region’s border ahead of the 2011 referendum.
It must also be stated that, the CPA failed to address many demands of the Eastern groups that fought in the North- South conflict.
A separate agreement (Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement) regulating power and wealth sharing at the regional level was signed between the Government and Eastern Front rebel groups in October 2006.
The implementation of all three major mechanisms to end the conflict, the CPA, the DPA, and the East Sudan Peace Agreement has been unsatisfactory, largely due to the resistance of Omar al Bashir’s ruling NCP.
According to the CPA, a nationwide census should have been conducted by the end of the second year of the interim period (July 2007). It would provide baseline information, which could be used for development and services across the country and determine electoral constituencies and the appropriate representation of North and South at the national level (with power-sharing percentages either confirmed or adjusted on the basis of the census results) as well as verify voter registration figures. One of the SPLM’s major complaints was that the NCP was dragging its feet on releasing the funds necessary for the census, feeling suspicions that it was seeking to delay the elections.
As part of the December 2007 agreement, the NCP pledged transparency in the management of the oil sector, as well as to re launching the National Petroleum Commission. The SPLM feels there was little transparency in the revenue figures it was receiving from the NCP. Because it was blocked from the production and marketing of the oil, it had no way of knowing how much was really sold and at what price, much less what kickbacks the NCP might be receiving.
The South has repeatedly accused the North of supporting the rebels. In March 2011 it produced documents claiming to prove that Sudanese President Omar al Bashir was heading a plot to overthrow the SPLM. The North denied the allegations.
On independence, the South is already one of the poorest countries in the world. It is tasked with the herculean effort of building a state almost from scratch and diversifying it sources of income, over 90% of which comes from oil.
Demarcation of the North-South border was to be carried out during the pre-interim period, immediately after the CPA was signed in January 2005, but the first reconnaissance survey of the North-South Technical Border Committee took place only in 2007. The lack of demarcation impacts on nearly every other issue, including the national unity government’s capacity to calculate a fair share of oil revenues, since the majority of oilfields lie along the border.
Mistrust between the parties remains high and the still unresolved issue of Abyei and other North- South borders complicate the political environment.
Recently, Barack Obama highlighted the further need for support in Darfur. This born out of the fact that peace keeping work is facing prolonged frustrations as peacekeepers are denied access to villages in need while the Darfur conflicts continue. There are fresh threats from the Sudanese army to ‘burn to the ground’ makeshift camps for people left homeless by the Darfur conflict. Inspite of the agreements Darfur peace is speckled with violence. Most movements in Darfur have been opposed to the agreement, claiming the agreement does not tackle their main concerns, e.g. the lack of prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, but also that there are no clear provisions for displaced persons to reclaim their land.
The political department of UNAMID's Civil Affairs Unit held a poll among the displaced persons of Zam Zam Camp, on how they view the Doha Agreement. The outcome of the survey was that people do not believe that the agreement will bring peace in Darfur. The reason for their justification is that three political major movements, as well as armed movements in Darfur did not sign the agreement, and never participated in the negotiations (Radio Dabanga).
8 WHAT WAS THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE CONFLICT?
The outcome of the Sudan and Darfur conflict was the signing of peace agreements; the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. Inspite of these agreements several issues that can nip the conflict in the bud have been left untouched, by the actors in the conflict. Therefore the conflict situation has not been properly resolved.
9 WHAT ARE THE POST CONFLICT SITUATION AND THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT?
Subsequent to the successful negotiation of the CPA, Sudan, with the assistance of the international community, began the daunting task of reconciling the past in order to move into a peaceful future. Once a peace agreement has been reached, there remains the influence of the conflict and the aftermath of war. The post-conflict reconstruction of a war-torn nation is critical in order to maintain peace and foster security and development
Following the arduous process of finding common interests and agreeing on peace, the period of rebuilding conflict-affected areas requires retraining, development and public awareness to move the nation forward. Peace agreements such as the CPA contain provisions to account for this period of reconstruction by including a mandate that calls for the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reconciliation (DDR) programme to reintegrate ex-combatants into
Society. Through a DDR programme, weapons are removed from society and ex-combatants are retrained to re-enter society with vocational skills.
9.1 SUDAN’S DDR PROGRAMME:
In Sudan, the CPA calls for a DDR programme that includes reconciliation and falls under the jurisdiction of the DDR Institute. The DRR programme is outlined in Part III of the ceasefire agreement and states two objectives: ‘to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and to support post peace-agreement social stabilization across the Sudan, particularly in war-affected areas (CPA 2005).’ The agreement further articulates the principles for and structure of the DDR institutions and calls for the parties to take steps in order ‘to avoid any possibilities of relapsing into war’ (CPA 2005). This process is assisted by the UN Mission to Sudan (UNMIS), which was mandated in March 2005 by Security Council Resolution 1590 ‘to assist in the establishment of the DDR programme as called for in the CPA, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction (UNSC S/RES/1590 2005).’ Owing to the challenges of rebuilding a nation after conflict, an interim DDR programme (IDDRP) was established to identify specific groups and outline needs and build capacity for a full-scale DDR programme in Sudan (UNDDR 2007). Within the context of the DDR programme, the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) oversees policy formation and coordinates the national DDR process (UNDDR 2007).
In Sudan, the DDR process was divided into regional implementing bodies that would administer the
DDR programme in the North and the South. These bodies fall under the jurisdiction of the North Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) and the South Sudan DDR Commission, which ‘are mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively (UNDDR 2007).’ In addition to the North and South focus for DDR, other armed groups (OAGs) have been targeted for disarmament and incorporation into the DDR process in order to further peace by including all parties involved in the conflict.
DISARMAMENT
Disarmament, the first stage of the DDR process, is a long, arduous and prolonged process following conflict. Combatants are scattered across the nation and separated into regions and ethnicities. The DDR process in Sudan was first split between the North and the South, providing the two regions with autonomy in the DDR process. This process allows the parties to remain independent under a federal system. The political will to carry out the DDR programme and integrate the ex-combatants into the joint forces or back into society remains within the respective regions. Therefore there must be a system that monitors the progress of the programme to ensure compliance in order to reduce suspicions that the other parties are not acting in good faith. When designing a peace process and a DDR programme, it is necessary to lay out the expectations of the process and to take into account the possibility of unintended consequences that may serve to hamper the process. The DDR provisions within the CPA called for the disarmament of ex-combatants and the reconfiguration of the national armed forces throughout the North and the South. In order to maintain a working military in the nation, combatants were to be delineated into one of four processes: the formation of a northern working military; the formation of a southern working military; the establishment of a new national North/ South combined force known as the Joint Integrated Forces (JIU); or into the DDR programme for retraining and integration into civilian society (Escola de cultura de pau 2007). The DDR process also includes retraining of personnel to serve in the police. The process of either redeploying ex-combatants into the JIUs or into the new regional military branches, as stipulated in the CPA, is to take place in support of the disarmament of ex-combatants that are to be demobilized and reintegrated into society. This process meets the interests of all parties by providing for regional military forces, joint national forces and the reintegration of excess combatants into society after they have been disarmed and retrained with skills that can assist the communities they are returning to.
9.2 INTRA-REGIONAL CONFLICT AND DISARMAMENT:
THE SOUTH
During Sudan’s civil war, the northern factions joined forces to fight the South and the southern factions joined together to fight the North. With the newly established peace, the old North/North and South/ South rivalries once again reignited in an effort for sub-regional groups to gain power and control over resources. The DDR process must account for these factions in the respective areas and assist communities in identifying interests and options for disarmament. The CPA and the parties to the peace agreement agreed on the establishment of a voluntary DDR programme, encouraging ex-combatants to enter the DDR programme. In return, the ex-combatants receive training where they develop skills that can be used to advance community development.
A voluntary approach to DDR encourages all parties to participate in the peace process while minimizing the tensions associated with forcing specific groups to disarm. When all parties have ownership of the process, they will understand the reasons for disarming and the options associated with the programme. This will limit interregional conflict and assist the parties with implementing the peace outlined in the CPA. The South of Sudan has been divided into multiple parties that are based primary on regional divisions and ethnic divides. Though the factions in the South were united under the SPLM/A during the civil war, as power and resources begin to be divided, there is an increased potential for infighting in the South.
The DDR programme in the South has concentrated on recognizing these divisions and disarming specific groups. As each group’s interest is to develop and make progress towards earning a livelihood, there remains a common cause for southern autonomy and self-reliance.
The splinter groups that make up the SPLM/A, the main power of the Government of Southern Sudan, include the ethnic groups of the Nuer, Dinka Murle, Taposa, Jikan, Shiluk, Rufa and Umbero (Young 2007). In addition, ethnic groups such as the Nuer, united under the Southern Sudan Defence
Force (SSDF), are subdivided into groups like the Gawaar Nuer and Lou Nuer, which are further divided into groups such as the Lou Nuer Uror and the Luo Nuer Niyirol (Young 2007). These factions, though recently united for the war against the North, are historically significant and must be taken into account in the DDR programme. The establishment of the CPA and the DDR programme has been stagnant due to mistrust between the parties, a lack of resources to implement peace and internal political rivalries (UNSC Res S/2007/41 2007). The Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006 followed the CPA as an effort to maintain unity between the SPLM/A and the SSDF in the South (Young 2007). This signified the initial efforts of the South to recognize the need to maintain a unified South and begin the disarmament of civilians in the region by absorbing various factions into one body (Young 2007). As the DDR programme is implemented, it is important to look back at the CPA and the interests of the parties involved and ensure that their needs and interests are taken into consideration as options are put on the table.
One of the main mandates of the DDR programme in Sudan is to disarm youth. When disarming groups such as the White Army – a coalition of Lou youth that fight for their ethnic group and have fought for the South – the interest of the youth in having weapons as a symbol of manhood and a means to obtain wealth through armed cattle raiding must be accounted for (Young 2007). The impact a lifetime of war has had on the psychosocial aspect of society must be assessed and
community mapping must be done in order to determine externalities that may occur when one part of the DDR process is implemented in the community.
In a voluntary disarmament process, as outlined in the CPA (2005), there must be public awareness campaigns to encourage combatants to disarm. This process cannot be forced or rushed and must continuously factor in culture and fears that there will be a reemergence of the conflict. Therefore, there must be regional reconciliation between the various groups and indicators that symbolize stability in the peace. Negotiations do not end with the signing of a peace agreement. They must continue through the process to ensure that the parties build upon their commitment to peace and continue to find common ground with similar interests.
THE NORTH
In the North of Sudan, there are also multiple groups that have in the past fought for power and political control. Today, the various factions in the North are united under the National Congress Party (formally the National Islamic Front); however, infighting remains as regions continue to vie for political power. The parties in the North are divided over the level of religious influence the government should have as well as issues related to ethnicity. The conflict in Darfur exemplifies the North/North conflict and the reluctance on the part of the northern government to unify the North and move forward with peace. In addition, conflicts like that in Darfur demonstrates the potential for factions to emerge out of a region that previously united for a common cause. The divisions in the North over Darfur are complicated by the emergence of sub-regional splinter groups in Darfur. This lack of cohesion impacts the DDR process, as implementation is stagnant and unable to further peace in the region. It is difficult to disarm and retrain combatants when the shadow of conflict continues to linger. The DDR programme provides an opportunity for the North to demonstrate its commitment to peace. It can be used to reunite the groups and foster peace if the different factions participate in the process and revisit the interests asserted in the CPA.
No comments:
Post a Comment