Figure 1: Map of Cameroon and Nigeria showing the location of bakassi peninsula the disputed area.
Plate 1: Showing Cameroonian soldiers station at Bakassi in August 2006.
Source: Adopted from (http://www.flickr.com/photos/25500453@N02/3425180747/)
Plate 2: An overview of the presence of rich mineral endowments (water)in Bakassi that has been use for fishing by the Nigerians.
Source: from (http://www.flickr.com/photos/25500453@N02/3425180747/)
Plate 3: From L-R President of Cameroon Paul Biya, Koffi Annan of the United Nation and the President of Nigeria Obasanjo. An accord of peace and reconciliation in New York-2008
Source: Adopted from (www.uno.org)
THE NIGERIAN- CAMEROUNIAN CRISIS OVER BAKASSI
ABSTRACT
The Bakassi Peninsula found in the gulf of guinea has for many years been a focal point for both Cameroon and Nigeria. This area is not only important for trade but also important due to the presence of the rich mineral deposits. The heighten debate and bone of contention over the Bakassi Peninsular has evolve basically around the fact that each country wanted to own the richly endowed Bakassi peninsula so as to control the large mineral deposit in the area. However, besides the rich oil and gas reserves found in the region, local agricultural and flora resources still flow for the benefits of both countries. Cross border trade continues to be of great importance to both local communities, hence proving the continuous military installation in the region. Nonetheless, the current situation of the area in question bears a lot of negative consequences for the inhabitant of both countries and its ecosystem at large.
Bakassi is the peninsula extension of the African territory of Calabar into the Atlantic Ocean. It is currently ruled by Cameroon following the transfer of sovereignty from neighbouring Nigeria as a result of a judgment by the International Court of Justice. On 22 November 2007, the Nigerian Senate rejected the transfer, since the Green Tree Agreement ceding the area to Cameroon was contrary to Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution. (Mbuh, 2004). Regardless, the territory was formally transferred to Cameroon on August 14, 2008.(BBC news, 2008)
INTRODUCTION
The Bakassi peninsula is an area of some 1,000 km of mangrove swamp and half submerged islands protruding into the Bight of Bonny. Since 18th century, the peninsular has been occupied by fishermen settlers most of whose inhabitants are Efik-speaking people of Nigeria (Anene, 1970). The peninsula, which apart from oil wealth also boasts of heavy fish deposit, has been a subject of serious dispute, between Nigeria and Cameroon with score of lives lost from military aggressions that have been mostly instigated by Cameroon (Olumide, 2002). The territorial dispute erupted into violence in May 1981, and intermittent skirmishes continued to take place until the matter was resolved. Nigeria apparently claimed that in 1884 the chiefs of the area accepted British protection, but did not relinquish sovereignty. It also maintains that the 1913 agreements that delimited the boundary from Yola to the sea were never ratified. The matter, however, took a legal turn on March 24, 1994 when Cameroon instituted a suit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, at the Hague, seeking an injunction for the expulsion of Nigerian force, which it said were occupying the territory and to restrain Nigeria from laying claim to sovereignty over the peninsular.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The root cause of the dispute over Bakassi is a legacy of imperialist colonial rule and neo-colonial regimes in Africa. The imperialist capitalist powers of Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, etcetera, in the 19th century partitioned and divided African territories and people among themselves without the least consideration to the language, social and cultural affinities of the African people for their selfish economic, political and strategic calculations. In many instances, the same ethnic nationality found itself divided into two or more colonial territories and ruled by different colonial authorities. (www.socialistworld.net).
The whole boundary dispute purportedly began when the Obong of Calabar signed a "Treaty of Protection" with Britain on September 10, 1884, Britain then agreed to "extend its protection" to the Obong and his Chiefs. The Obong agreed and promised to refrain from entering into any agreements or treaties with foreign nations or Powers without the prior approval of the British Government (Anene, 1970). That is, he signed away his Kingdom as a British protectorate. All of this was before "Nigeria" was created. On November 15, 1893, Britain and Germany defined their boundaries in Africa, supplemented by another agreement on March 19, 1906. These covered British and German Territories from Yola to Lake Chad.
In 1900, 1903 and 1906, key declarations were made and were militarily enforced which created the colonies of 'Northern Nigeria' and 'Southern Nigeria'. The Obong of Calabar was neither consulted nor did he resist. This was all conducted between metropolitan powers and they understood what they were doing. "Protectorates" became "Colonies". (www.dawodu.com/thebakassistoryPart1.htm).
In 1913, Britain and Germany reached an agreement on their border from Yola to the Sea. The first of these agreements was signed in London on March 11, 1913 titled: " The Settlement of the Frontier between Nigeria and the Cameroons, from Yola to the Sea and secondly, The Regulation of Navigation on the Cross River". The second was signed at Obokum on April 12, 1913 by Hans Detzner, representing Germany, and W. V. Nugent, representing Britain (Wikipedia, 2011). It addressed the precise demarcation of the Anglo-German Boundary between Nigeria and Kamerun from Yola to the Cross River.
For Bakassi peninsula in particular, the Germans were interested in shrimps and an undertaking that Britain would not seek to expand eastwards. The British were interested in uninterrupted and secure sea lane access to Calabar, a key trading post. Since the Germans already had the option of using Douala environs as a port, they conceded the "navigable portion" of the offshore border to Britain. In exchange, Britain conceded the Bakassi peninsula proper to Germany. In other words, to get Germany's cooperation not to threaten access to Calabar, Bakassi peninsula was conceded by Britain.
The First World War broke out in 1914. In 1916, Britain invaded German Kamerun. Among the Nigerian troops and carriers fighting for Britain were natives of Nigeria, including some from present Cross- River State. At the end of the war, all German territories were divided between France and Britain by the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations placed them under British or French mandate. The boundaries between British and French mandated Kamerun was defined by the Franco-British Declaration of July 10, 1919 by Viscount Milner, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Henry Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies. In this agreement Bakassi and the rest of what became known as "British Cameroons" were placed under British mandate and administered coterminous with "Nigeria" but not actually merged. The old 1913 border was retained. To codify this further, another agreement was signed December 29, 1929 and January 31, 1930 between Sir Graeme Thomson, Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, and Paul Marchand, Commissioner of the French Republic to the Cameroun. This Declaration was ratified and incorporated in an Exchange of Notes on January 9, 1931 between the French Ambassador in London and the British Foreign Minister.
During the Second World War which began in 1939, native Nigerians also fought for Britain. After the war, the British and French League of Nations mandates over the Southern and Northern Cameroons and were replaced by trusteeship agreements under the new United Nations approved by the General Assembly on December 13, 1946. These UN agreements re-ratified the prior borders as codified by the previous Anglo-German and Anglo-French agreements. (Idumange, 2010).
On August 2nd, 1946 Britain divided the Cameroons into two, called "Northern Cameroons" and "Southern Cameroons". The 1946 'Order in Council' contained detailed provisions describing the border separating these two regions, now conveniently administered from colonial Nigeria - but not part of it. In 1954, the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued a legal order defining the border between Nigeria's "Eastern region" and the "Southern Cameroons". Bakassi Peninsula was in the "Southern Cameroons", distinct from the Eastern region and the Calabar province and maps from that period show this very clearly.
In March 1959, the UN asked Britain to clarify the wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern Cameroons trusteeship territories in the run up to the "independence" of Nigeria and Cameroon. On January 1st, 1960 the French Cameroons became independent. Instruments creating the new country and exchange of notes between France and Cameroon rehashed all its colonial boundaries as defined by previous colonial agreements. On October 1st, 1960, Nigeria became independent. Instruments creating the new country and exchange of notes between Britain and Nigeria rehashed all its colonial boundaries as defined by previous colonial agreements. On February 11th and 12th 1961, a plebiscite was held to "clarify the wishes of the people living in Northern and Southern Cameroons". The population of Northern Cameroons had earlier in 1959 decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria, while the population of Southern Cameroons, whose plebiscite could not be done in 1959 for security reasons, now "decided to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon" (General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961).
In 1962, the government of Tafawa Balewa exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroun acknowledging the fact that Bakassi was not Nigerian territory. Maps from that period showed Bakassi peninsula in Cameroon, following the results of the 1961 plebiscite.
In January 1966, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi came to power in Nigeria. He committed his government to respect all prior international agreements made by the Balewa government. In July 1966, Lt. Col. Gowon came to power in Nigeria and he also committed his government to respect all prior international agreements made by the Ironsi and Balewa government.
In 1970, moves began to be made by independent Cameroon and post-civil war Nigeria to clarify their maritime border which was vaguely defined by the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Maps from that period showed Bakassi peninsula in Cameroon, but the offshore boundary was unclear since there was no detailed de-embarkation of the "navigable portion" of the approach channel to the Calabar estuary. Then Attorney General Elias correctly advised the Gowon government that post-colonial Nigeria had no legal basis for contesting the Bakassi peninsula itself, but that work to delimit the offshore boundary and vague sections of the land boundary should proceed at full speed in accordance with the original Anglo-German Treaty of 1913. The technical problem thus became deciding exactly what part was "navigable" and what was not. It is this matter that was addressed on April 4th, 1971 at Yaoundé when Nigeria's General Gowon and Cameroon President Ahidjo, accompanied by large delegations, signed the "Coker-Ngo" Line on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433 "as far as the 3-nautical-mile limit." ( Mbuh, 2004)
On June 1st, 1975, Gowon and Ahidjo signed the Maroua Declaration for the partial extension of the 1971 maritime boundary. Again, the status of the Bakassi peninsula proper was not even an issue for discussion. On July 29, 1975 General Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Muhammed. One of the first acts of that regime was to begin to question all the domestic and foreign policy decisions made by General Gowon - including the offshore maritime border with Cameroon. In the rush to smear Gowon publicly, he was held accountable for "giving away Bakassi" The rest of what transpired in 1981, 1994, 1996 and since then is well known including General Abacha's moves to formally create an administrative set up there and all the military clashes.
THE ISSUES IN CONTENTION
The border dispute is over the Bakassi Peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea, the 1,500-km border between Cameroon and Nigeria, and several areas along Lake Chad. The dispute can be narrowed into two main issues: the fight for the Bakassi Peninsula associated with the potential oil development and fisheries off the Peninsula's shores; and the partially resolved dispute over certain areas of the Lake Chad region associated with nationalist ties of several groups to the land as a result of colonialism. In essence, there are two concurrent issues at hand, the potential for environmental damage resulting from oil development and excessive fishing in the Bakassi region and the potential for further violence as Ambazonians (English speaking Cameroonians), Francophone Cameroonians, Nigerians and the inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula (Efik) contest the region's demarcated areas of the border decision by the International Court of Justice.
In terms of environmental issues, in recent years Lake Chad has flooded numerous times, forcing local fishermen to either become farmers or move with the changing shoreline, causing them to cross international borders in the process. This has further exacerbated nationalistic tensions in the region
The peninsula of Bakassi is a tiny land strip consisting of a series of fluvial islands covering approximately 50 square kilometres and inhabited by some dozens of villages. The area in contention is a swampy peninsula projecting into the Atlantic at the Gulf of Guinea. Cameroon and Nigeria both claim sovereignty and nourished the dispute for eight years at the International Court of Justice. Even Equatorial Guinea wants it. The dispute as said earlier, is about potential offshore oil resources. (Afrol News, 2002). Bakassi is an area which may contain up to 10% of the world's oil and gas reserves. It is also rich in fish which also is a source of foreign exchange earner for Nigeria and Cameroun. (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 2006).
But interest over the ownership of Bakassi by Nigeria and Cameroon began immediately it was discovered that the peninsular is floating on reserves of crude oil. It was only then that the elites of the two countries started making serious claims and counter-claims over the territory. In essence, the struggle by the Nigerian and Cameroonian ruling classes for ownership of the peninsula is not dictated by any so-called national interest or concern for the well-being of the residents of Bakassi. The primary motive is the rich oil reserves and fishing grounds found in the area and its strategic location in the Atlantic Ocean. If the peninsula were to be of very little economic or strategic value, neither Nigerian nor Cameroonian capitalist elite would have shown any serious interest in the territory. (www.socialistworld.net/doc/403#).
The Bakassi border dispute has a military and maritime side to it. Nigerian naval officers told Reuters that the loss of Bakassi would cause severe strategic problems for the Nigerian Navy by rendering the naval base at Calibre useless. "If we lose Bakassi, we lose our eastern access to the Atlantic. Our naval ships cannot move freely to southern Africa, for instance, without Cameroon's approval, one officer said. (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 2002).
An objective examination of the Nigeria – Cameroon imbroglio at the Bakassi Peninsula reveals three main positions:
- The Bakassi problem was a creation of the imperialists, colonialists and capitalists who for selfish reasons placed the map of Africa on a table and butchered the continent for their own economic interest. The same imperialists have intensified the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon.
- The real issues in contention are economic and strategic. The Peninsula only became attractive when huge oil reserves were found. Again the prolific fishing grounds in the Peninsula and its strategic location at the Atlantic Ocean is another added advantage.
- There are many Nigerian émigrés in the Peninsular. In fact it is estimated that 90 percent of the inhabitants of Bakassi are Nigerians of Efik extraction. Most Nigerians in the area are either traders, or fishermen who seek greener pastures and better means of livelihood. But the Maroua Declaration signed by Gowon and Ahidjo was to compensate Cameroon for her neutrality during the 30-month civil war in Nigeria.
THE DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT
Cameroon and Nigeria have come to the brink of war several times over the ownership of the peninsula in 1981 and 1996. On May 15, 1981, a Cameroon national radio news report states that a Nigerian military patrol army violated Cameroon's territory by infiltrating the Peninsula (as far as the Rio del Ray) and opened fire on the Cameroon army (Hotline News, No. 0064, 1998) .Cameroon returned fire, killing five Nigerian soldiers. In 1992-1993, the Cameroon government openly killed some Nigerian civilians in Cameroon, stemming from multiparty democratic government and growing militarism for Anglophone autonomy. Other Nigerians were forced out of Cameroon during harassing tax-drives. The Bakassi dispute intensified with two or more serious incidents that provoked more shooting, casualties and deaths of soldiers in both countries. In 1994 and from January-May 1996, there were border clashes between Cameroon and Nigeria between military personnel. As of May 6, 1996, diplomats reported that over fifty Nigerian soldiers had been killed and a number taken as prisoners. There was no information available for Cameroonian casualties (New York Times, 1996). The conflict escalated again on February 3, 1996. From the Ambazonian (South Cameroons) side, the Anglophone movement in Cameroon has no trust in the Cameroon government due to the failed implementation of the Plebiscite Treaty, which was to unite all Cameroonians under a federal form of government. Ambazonians demand total independence as it views Bakassi as its own (Mayel, 2001) From 1919-1958, Southern Cameroons jointly administered with Nigeria. Nigerian maps recognized the Peninsula as part of the Ambazonian territory (Mbuh, 2004). There was violence in the region on June 21, 2005 when Nigerian troops fired rocket-propelled grenades at Cameroon security posts, killing one Cameroonian soldier (http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp).
The 1,690-kilometer border with Cameroon, witnessed several clashes. (Neither Cameroon nor Chad was a signatory of the ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of community citizens; hence greater border tensions existed between these countries and Nigeria. In 1981 five Nigerian soldiers were killed and three wounded when a Cameroonian patrol boat fired on a Nigerian vessel off the contested Rio del Rey area, which was thought to be rich in oil, gas, and uranium deposits. Coming in the wake of an incursion by Beninoise troops, this incident provoked public demands for compensation, for punitive measures, and even for war. The crisis was settled peaceably, tensions along the frontier continued, however, and in May 1987, Cameroonian gendarmes allegedly occupied sixteen border villages in Borno State until repulsed by Nigerian army units. Lagos then the Federal Capital Territory issued orders to state governors "to take military reprisals against any belligerent neighbouring country," and tension remained high until Ibrahim Babangida's December visit to Yaounde, capital of Cameroon, yielded mutual pledges of steps to prevent a recurrence of border clashes, including joint border patrols. In October 1989, Cameroonian gendarmes allegedly abducted four Nigerian customs officials on routine border patrol duties. In mid-1990 boundary demarcation was still in process, and minor clashes between border residents and transients continued. Deeper divisions were apparent when Yaounde media charged Nigerian agitators with instigating illegal demonstrations in Bamenda and at Yaounde University in May 1990 and with seeking to incite a popular revolt; the Nigerian media made counter charges that Nigerians were being systematically harassed, detained, tortured, or murdered by Cameroonian security forces. (www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/national_security/nigeria).
Nigeria took several measures during the 1980s to improve and to strengthen overall border management. After the 1981 clash with Cameroon, Nigeria decided to fence its entire international boundary, to enclose each border beacon, and to augment its immigration staff by 1,000. In the mid-1980s, Nigeria's 2,100 immigration officers were given a four-week weapons training course, new border posts were established, and modern border- patrol and surveillance equipment was procured. The 1984 border closure was designed to control widespread currency trafficking and smuggling. The borders reopened only after Nigeria set up trade corridors and joint border patrols with its neighbours and began a program to strengthen and expand customs and patrol posts. In late 1986, after signing phase two of the ECOWAS protocols on free movement of community citizens, Nigeria said it would deploy immigration officers to each local government to regulate movement in and out of the country and proposed to open 100 new control posts--there had been 45. In addition, Lagos planned to purchase aircraft, helicopters, boats, vehicles, and communication and surveillance equipment; the initial US$13 million phase included 25 speedboats, more than 1,400 Land Rovers and patrol cars, and 200 motorcycles. After the mid-1987 clash with Cameroon, the Nigerian army intensified its border patrols and considered permanently stationing units on the frontiers.
However, armed assaults continued to plague the Bakassi region over the years, and in expanded fields. For instance, in 1992-1993, faced with multiparty democratic challenges, and the growing militarism for Anglophone autonomy, the Cameroun government resorted to open oppression in which some Nigerian civilians in Cameroun were killed. Many were forced out of Cameroun during many embarrassing and harassing tax-drives. As Africa Confidential noted, "Nigeria's…decision to deploy a thousand troops on the peninsula was in turn a reaction to the harassment of Nigerian fishing vessels and traders by Cameroonian Gendarmes." (www.postwatchmagazine.com). The Bakassi border dispute escalated with two more serious incidents of incursion that provoked more shooting, recording many casualties and deaths of soldiers of both countries. The first incident was the open hostility that broke the stalemate over Bakassi on February 18-19, 1994. It was after this incident that Cameroon decided to take the border dispute to the International Court Justice for its adjudication. Cameroon's application was deposited on March 29, 1994, amidst accusations from Nigeria that Cameroon was not committed to bilateral negotiations to resolve the matter locally. (www.postwatchmagazine.com).
After eight years, on 10 October 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague ceded to Cameroon the Bakassi peninsula. Reasons given were based on the finding (based principally on the Anglo-German agreements) that sovereignty over Bakassi did indeed rest with Cameroon. It instructed Nigeria to transfer possession of the peninsula, but did not require the inhabitants to move or to change their nationality. Cameroon was thus given a substantial Nigerian population and was required to protect their rights, infrastructure and welfare. (www.en.wikipedia.org/bakassi). The verdict caused consternation in Nigeria. It aroused vitriolic comments from Nigerian officials and the Nigerian media alike. Chief Richard Akinjide, a former Nigerian Attorney-General and Minister of Justice who was a leading member of Nigeria's legal team, described the decision as "50% international law and 50% international politics", "blatantly biased and unfair", "a total disaster", and a "complete fraud". The Guardian newspaper went further, declaring that the judgment was "a rape and unforeseen potential international conspiracy against Nigerian territorial integrity and sovereignty" and "part of a Western ploy to foment and perpetuate trouble in Africa"(www.postwatchmagazine.com).
THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING PROCESS
The key participants in the border conflict are Nigeria, Cameroon, the Efik people occupying Bakassi and the International Court of Justice. Other participants are Equitorial Guinea based on their weak claim to Bakassi and Sao Tome and Principe based on maritime borders with Cameroon. The United States of America, Britain, Germany, and France are also key actors in the negotiation and bargaining process.
The UN played a very active role in the bargaining and negotiation process, the good office of the Secretary General was also very influential in the resolution of the conflict. Koffi Annam held series of meetings with the president of Nigeria and Cameroon and this culminate into the Green Tree agreement in New York which brought a lasting peace to the conflict.
Germany, France, the UK, and the US provided core support to the settlement process, with France and the UK in particular applying pressure to maintain the momentum. The UN’s continued engagement in the process was vital once the agreement was signed. More crucial, however, was the role of the media, who proved capable of helping matters by restraining themselves from aggravating adverse reactions in both Nigeria and Cameroon.
France, although not actively and directly involved in the process, took the stance that Bakassi belonged to Cameroon by citing treaties signed, at and after independence was granted to both countries. This greatly generated anger in Nigeria, where France’s investment by far exceeds their investment in the rest of Africa put together. Neither did this go down well with the opposition in Cameroon which sees the lack of progress in democratisation process in Cameroon as a result of French meddling in Cameroonian politics in favour of the ruling government. Chief Richard Akindije, who was a member of the Nigerian legal team during the court proceedings asserts that “We must accept that, the ICJ judgement is 50 percent international law and 50 percent politics. And as far as the case between Nigeria and Cameroon was concerned, the dispute was really between Nigeria and France. Cameroon was just the proxy for France.” (Newswatch, 2002). France in particular, was therefore seen at least by Nigeria as a major actor in the conflict.
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan employed his good office in the negotiation process and was very instrumental in the amicable resolution of the conflict. Series of meetings were conducted by him at various locations where he succeeded in convincing both presidents (Obasanjo and Biya) to commit themselves to respect and implement the decision of the Court. He was able to obtain an agreement from them, to establish a mechanism to give effect to the decision.
THE NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING PROCESS
After the very first major incident of May 16, 1981, both countries resorted to diplomatic means to bring an end to the conflict. President Shehu Shagari insisted on an apology from the Cameroonian government for the deaths of five Nigerian soldiers killed in action on the grounds that they were not on the Rio del Rey but on the Akwayafe River. Cameroon, made a formal apology in July 1981, promised to pay reparations and the issue was laid to rest. However, the fact that it resurfaced slightly a decade after meant that the underlying dynamics had not been addressed. On March 29, 1994, after many years of low-keyed sporadic attacks on both sides, Cameroon finally decided to take the case to the UN for arbitration in order to prevent greater human and material loss and in its pursuit of peace, stating in her application that the delimitation of the maritime borders with Nigeria was incomplete and that despite many attempts to complete it, the two parties have been unable to do so. Nigeria which had hoped that bilateral or multilateral talks at the local level could help bring an end to the conflict was not happy with the decision. She even considered the timing of the law suit a pre-emptive move on the part of Cameroon claiming that with the Abacha regime being very unpopular with the international community and French backing at the ICJ, Cameroon was sure to win the case. According to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, both parties to a conflict must declare their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court before it can accept an application (ICJ, 2002). On June 16, 1994, Nigeria indicated it had no objections to the Cameroonian law suit and fixed a time limit for the filing of written proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea filed in an application to intervene in the case to “protect the legal rights of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in the Gulf of Guinea by all legal means available” and to “inform the Court of the nature of the legal rights and interests of Equatorial Guinea that could be affected by the Court’s decision in the light of the maritime boundary claims advanced by the parties to the case before the Court. However, Equatorial Guinea did not seek to become party to the case. Public hearings took place between February 13 and 21 March 2002.
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan invited Presidents Biya of Cameroon and Obasanjo of Nigeria to a summit meeting in Paris on 5 September 2002. At this meeting, he was able to convince both presidents to commit themselves to respect and implement whatever decision the Court arrived at. He was able to obtain an agreement from them, to establish a mechanism to give effect to the decision. It is important to note here that while both countries were more or less ready to accept the Court’s decision, none of them had come up with any concrete proposals of their own for the implementation of the ruling. Mr. Annan also showed proof of great understanding and foresight by making sure that France, the United States and Britain – all nations trusted by both countries - backed this initiative. Though many will disagree, credit also goes to both Presidents for recognizing the fact that the border dispute was to be seen within the greater context of the overall relationship between both states. Kofi Annan appealed to both countries to respect and implement the Court’s judgment and reaffirmed the readiness of the UN to assist both countries. The final decision on Bakassi was passed by the Court on October 10, 2002. In a verdict of 13 to 3 votes, it was found that sovereignty over the peninsula did rest with Cameroon. Nigeria was requested to expeditiously and without condition withdraw its forces and civil administration and transfer possession of the peninsula to Cameroon within two years. Likewise, Cameroon was asked to withdraw its forces and administration from territories which in accordance to the decision now fell within the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (ICJ, 2002)
In his relentless effort to achieve lasting peace between both countries, Kofi Annan once again invited both presidents to a seminal meeting in Geneva on November 15, 2002, where both leaders agreed to request the Secretary-General to set-up a Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission made up of representatives of both countries and UN experts chaired by a special representative of the Secretary-General. The function of the Mixed Commission was to work out ways of implementing the ruling of the Court and moving the process forward. Annan’s proposal of his special representative for West Africa, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah from Mauritania to chair the Mixed Commission was considered acceptable by both sides. In that atmosphere of brotherhood, the two countries accepted to identify a number of confidence-building measures.
On 2 December 2002, a United Nations-chaired panel on the Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula held its first formal session in Yaoundé. The meeting of the "mixed commission" - so named because it comprises representatives from both sides - was set to focus on establishing a programme and a calendar of work. The meeting was chaired by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Adballah. The commission was formed in response to a the October ruling on the Bakassi dispute by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which awarded Cameroon rights to the oil-rich peninsula. Following the Court's decision, Nigeria asserted that the judgment did not consider "fundamental facts" about the Nigerian inhabitants of the territory, whose "ancestral homes" the International Court of Justice had adjudged to be in Cameroonian territory. Meeting with Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Geneva in November, Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon agreed to set up the commission to handle their differences, mandating it to consider all the implications of the ICJ's decision, including the need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries. (www.un.org/News).
On 3 December, 2002, a United Nations-chaired panel addressing the border controversy between Cameroon and Nigeria decided to dispatch an assessment mission to the disputed Bakassi peninsula to grasp the issues related to the countries' disagreement. The mission visited the affected areas in order to better understand and appreciate the practical problems it would have to deal with and resolve in the course of the implementation of its mandate.
The panel also agreed to establish a sub-commission, comprising legal experts and cartographers from Nigeria, Cameroon and the United Nations, responsible for the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries. The sub-commission also met before the end of January, 2003 and prepared a small-scale map indicating the boundary and also considered the nature and characteristics of the maps that needed to be prepared for the demarcation.
THE SUCCESS OF THE BARGAINING
After the successful work of the Mixed Commission, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan brokered a final deal between the two presidents at Green Tree just outside New York on 12 June 2006, which was baptized the Green Tree Accord. This last tripartite meeting sealed off the implementation of the Court’s ruling of October 2002. According to Kofi Annan, the signing ceremony “crowns a remarkable experiment in conflict prevention by Cameroon and Nigeria.”(UN, 2006). According to the terms of the accord, Nigeria was to withdraw its troops from Bakassi within a 60 day period with the possibility of a 30 day extension. The signing ceremony was witnessed by representatives of France, the US and Great Britain. Amid fears that rebellious youths disgruntled with the outcome of the conflict, Nigeria finally lowered its flag for the last time and the flag of Cameroon was hoisted in a solemn military ceremony attended by top officials from both countries in the presence of many other top ranking African observers on 14 August 2006. Speeches given at the ceremony showed proof of the spirit of peace and brotherhood and the firm resolution between both countries to avert war.
The withdrawals of civilian administration, military and police forces and transfers of authority in the Lake Chad area, in December 2003, marked a significant step forward in the implementation of the ICJ judgment. Progress is being made towards the withdrawals and transfers of authority in the Land Boundary and the Bakassi peninsula. In the meantime, the parties have agreed to initiate a number of political and economic confidence-building measures, and to consider the adoption of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between their countries. Although more remains to be achieved, this story illustrates the crucial role of multilateral measures, such as the potential of dialogue and conflict resolution offered by recourse to the ICJ. The Mixed Commission also represents a notable initiative and can be seen as an exemplary model for preventive diplomacy and a precious tool for moving from a culture of reaction to a culture of peace. The case also illustrates the importance of the good offices of the Secretary-General used to assist the parties in implementing the Court’s decision and could serve as a precedent of how to address border and other issues that may threaten peace and security.
OUTCOME OF THE PROCESS
On 12 June, 2006 the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon signed an agreement that settled the border dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. This action followed intensive mediation by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who wants to avert a potential crisis flashpoint in already troubled West Africa. “The signing ceremony which has brought us together crowns a remarkable experiment in conflict prevention by Cameroon and Nigeria,” Mr. Annan said of the agreement which provides for the withdrawal of Nigerian troops within 60 days, with a possible 30 day extension. The agreement was reached at a ceremony at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset outside New York City, United States of America and the agreement was named the Greentree Agreement. (www.mailgroundreport.com)
Under the agreement transitional arrangements will be completed in two years for the Peninsula, which was the last of four areas to be demarcated in accordance with the ICJ decision. There were also Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States of America, who are witnesses and who will help implement the agreement. (www.un.org/News).
Nigeria began to withdraw its military, comprising some 3000 troops, beginning 1 August 2006, and a ceremony on 14 August marked the formal handover of the northern part of the peninsula. The remainder will stay under Nigerian civil authority for two more years. (www.en.wikipedia.org/bakassi).
The Nigerian Senate ruled on November 22, 2007 that the handover of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon is illegal. The federal government is yet to take action. The government handed the final parts of Bakassi over to Cameroon on 14 August 2008 as planned, but a court had stated this should be delayed until all accommodations for resettled Bakassians had been settled; the government did not seem to plan to heed this court order and did set the necessary mechanisms into motion to override it. The solemn handing over ceremony was observed by delegates from Nigeria and Cameroun while the international community and states served as witnesses. The final transfer of authority took place in Calabar. Fishermen displaced from Bakassi had been settled in a landlocked area called New Bakassi, which they claim is already inhabited and not suitable for fishermen like them but only for farmers. (Wikipedia, 2011).
Some 3,000 pillars are being planted to demarcate the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. The U.N.-sponsored project was due to end in 2007. The placement of the markers is a significant milestone in achieving lasting peace between Nigeria and Cameroun. According to Said Djinnit, the representative of the U.N. Secretary General for West Africa and chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, it is a border which is meant to bring people together, not to separate them. He says it gives people an opportunity to work freely within a context of clear borders that will prevent further disputes so that all the energies, resources of the two countries are channeled towards addressing the real socioeconomic problems of the people. (www.voanews.com).
The $12 million (U.S.) needed for the pillars come from a U.N. Trust Fund. Cameroon and Nigeria are each contributing three million U.S. dollars, with Britain and the European Commission providing the rest. Technical experts are used motorbikes and canoes and trekking over mountains and through thick forests to trace the over 2000-km boundary from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. However, Nigerians doing business across the border still complain of harassment and extortion at the hands of Cameroonian gendarmes. In Bakassi, the predominantly Nigerian population says its rights are not being fully protected.
THE POST CONFLICT SITUATION AND PRESENT CONDITION
After the peace process and the return of Bakassi to the Cameroonians, the people of bakassi peninsula were always complaining of harassment by the Cameroonian gendarmes. Nigerians continue to flee Bakassi everyday because of these harassments. Punch Newspaper reported that the camp in Ekpri Ikang, Cross River State has swelled to 1,500 refugees. A camp initially meant for 400 people. (Punch Newspapers, 23 March, 2009).
Apart from the harassment of the indigenes, various activities have been going on in the Bakassi peninsula like the hijacking of a Nigerian cargo ship. The hijacker’s demanded a ransom of 1.5 dollars before the ship, captain and one of the crew members can be released. Two weeks before that time a group calling itself the African Marine Commando hijacked a Chinese fishing vessel in the area with seven man crew on board. (Punch Newspapers, 2010).
The suffering of the Bakassi people is unimaginable and their call to the federal government went unheeded. People of Bakassi then reopened the case against the federal government for compensation to the tune of N456 billion. (Punch Newspapers, 2009). It was stated that the federal government did not carter for the people of Bakassi and the Bakassi people also wanted a new local government council. Indigenes of various states like Delta, Imo States that formerly reside in Bakassi are moving back and the various state governments have providing for them, making their life meaningful.
Recently, the Cameroonian authorities made a claim to parts of Obudu ranch saying that their boundary stretches down to it. Gov. Liyel Imoke refuted the claim but a Commission of Enquiry has been set up to look into the issue.
As at now, Bakassi peninsula is now deserted because people have left fearing for their lives. Nigeria will hand over the peninsula to Cameroun finally by 2012 according to the Green Tree Agreement, and then the tax drives and other forms of harassment will be fully initiated.
CONCLUSION
On Thursday 10, October 2002 the International Court of Justice, Hague delivered judgment on the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula and gave ownership to Cameroon over Nigeria. The court decision was based on the Anglo-German agreement of 11 March 1913. The court’s decision was that the boundary follows the mouth of the River Akpakorum, dividing the Mangrove Island near Ikang as far as a straight line joining Bakassi point and King point. In that judgment, the court requested Nigeria to expeditiously and without condition withdraw its administrative and military or police force from the area of Lake Chad falling within the Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi peninsula. It also requested Cameroon to expeditiously and without condition withdraw any administrative or military or police forces which may be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi peninsula on territories, which pursuant to the judgment fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria.
What are the implications of this judgment for the Nigeria state? For one, there are fears that losing Bakassi to Cameroon may mean the loss of the entrance to the Calabar port to Cameroon. This is because the entrance to the Calabar port lies in the Calabar channel and going by the terms of the 1913 agreement between Britain and Germany which the World court relied upon as the authority for Cameroon’s claim to Bakassi, the channel belongs to Cameroon. Secondly, the loss of Bakassi has also placed the multi-million naira Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in serious danger. This is because the Calabar EPZ depends largely on this important segment, it would only mean that the port belongs to Cameroon out rightly or Nigeria will have to pay charge. There is also the danger of losing 100 million barrels of oil deposit and also four trillion cubic feet of gas deposits in the peninsula. This will be a result of the oil companies having to leave the area and relinquish the oil wells to the Cameroonians, the implication of this is that the huge revenue got from “Bakassi oil” will be lost to Nigeria. A nation striving to improve the lot of its people by adequately utilizing their sources of revenue will surely feel the severe impact of this type of judgment on the entire economy. The social implications of the ruling are that Nigerians, who have lived in Bakassi all their lives, will have to face the sad reality of having to evacuate a region that is part and parcel of them immediately. Most people living in that areas have their businesses located there and so leaving the area will mean detaching them from their source of income. Moreover, all infrastructural facilities, including hospitals, schools, recreational centres, that were originally put in place by the country stands the risk of being forfeited resulting in a fruit less effort and loss of income. Another far-reaching implication of the judgment is the strategic or security implication for the Nigerian state. The victory of Cameroon will make the nation lose its eastern access to the Atlantic. This implies that without Cameroon’s approval, Nigeria’s naval ships cannot move freely to southern Africa and for security reasons this is not too pleasant and not in the interest of the nation.
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