Apatheid in South Afrrica :By Nnekwe Linus. Research fellow
in Institute of African studies (Peace and Conflicts)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Republic Of South Africa
1.0 APARTHEID – THE ISSUES IN CONTENTION
2.0 THE NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT DIMENSIONS OF THE APARTHEID CONFLICT
2.1 The Decade of Non-Violent Resistance
2.2 Decades of Repression
2.3 The Decade of Violence
3.0 NEGOTIATIONS TO END APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 SECRET MEETINGS
3.1.1 Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith
3.1.2 Early Contact - the South African Government and Nelson Mandela
3.1.3 Unbanning Of Opposition Organisations And The Release Of Mandela
3.2 INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS
3.2.1 Groote Schuur Minute
3.2.2 Pretoria Minute
3.3 NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD
3.3.1 CODESA I
3.3.2 CODESA Participants
3.3.3 CODESA II And The Breakdown Of Negotiations
3.3.4 Resumption Of Negotiations
3.3.5 Record of Understanding
3.3.6 Multiparty Negotiating Forum
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
4.0 THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE APARTHEID CONFLICT
4.1 Tricameral Parliament
4.2 Reforms And Contact With The ANC Under Botha
4.3 Presidency of F.W. de Klerk
5.0 SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID
5.1 POST – CONFLICT SITUATION
5.1.1 The Economic Plight of Post-apartheid South Africa
5.1.2 The Political Situation in Post-apartheid South Africa
5.1.3 The Dismissal of Winnie Mandela
5.1.4 The Mandela Government And The Workers' Movement
5.2 CURRENT ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA
6.0 SUMMARY OF THE END OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
REFERENCES
APPENDIX - SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF APARTHEID
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
About 79.5% of the South African population is of black African ancestry, divided among a variety of ethnic groups speaking different Bantu languages, nine of which have official status. South Africa also contains the largest communities of European, Asian, and racially mixed ancestry in Africa. About a quarter of the population is unemployed and lives on less than US $1.25 a day.
South Africa’s Coat of Arms
Provinces of South Africa
1.0 APARTHEID – THE ISSUES IN CONTENTION
The major issue in contention in the Apartheid conflict in South Africa was the Apartheid system of government. This system was characterised by the following:
· Racial discrimination and segregation
· Separateness
· Banning of all opposition organisations
· Cracking down on black opposition to apartheid leading to imprisonments and exiles
· Creation of homelands for the blacks
· Prohibition of inter-racial interactions
Apartheid was a system of racial discrimination and segregation in South African government. It was formalised in 1948, forming a framework for political and economic dominance by the white population and severely restricting the political rights of the black majority. Between 1960 and 1990, the African National Congress and other mainly black opposition political organisations were banned. As the National Party cracked down on black opposition to apartheid, most leaders of ANC and other opposition organisations were either imprisoned or went in exile. Apartheid (pronounced apart-hate) is an Afrikaans word meaning "seperateness" - it was a legal system whereby people were classified into racial groups - White, Black, Indian and Coloured; and seperate geographic areas were demarcated for each racial group. Apartheid laws were part of South Africa's legal framework from 1948 to 1994.
South Africa was colonized by the English and Dutch in the seventeenth century. English domination of the Dutch descendents (known as Boers or Afrikaners) resulted in the Dutch establishing the new colonies of Orange Free State and Transvaal. The discovery of diamonds in these lands around 1900 resulted in an English invasion which sparked the Boer War. Following independence from England, an uneasy power-sharing between the two groups held sway until the 1940's, when the Afrikaner National Party was able to gain a strong majority. Strategists in the National Party invented apartheid as a means to cement their control over the economic and social system. Initially, aim of the apartheid was to maintain white domination while extending racial separation. Starting in the 60's, a plan of ``Grand Apartheid'' was executed, emphasizing territorial separation and police repression.
With the enactment of apartheid laws in 1948, racial discrimination was institutionalized. Race laws touched every aspect of social life, including a prohibition of marriage between non-whites and whites, and the sanctioning of ``white-only'' jobs. In 1950, the Population Registration Act required that all South Africans be racially classified into one of three categories: white, black (African), or colored (of mixed decent). The coloured category included major subgroups of Indians and Asians. Classification into these categories was based on appearance, social acceptance, and descent. For example, a white person was defined as ``in appearance obviously a white person or generally accepted as a white person.'' A person could not be considered white if one of his or her parents were non-white. The determination that a person was ``obviously white'' would take into account ``his habits, education, and speech and deportment and demeanor.'' A black person would be of or accepted as a member of an African tribe or race, and a colored person is one that is not black or white. The Department of Home Affairs (a government bureau) was responsible for the classification of the citizenry. Non-compliance with the race laws were dealt with harshly. All blacks were required to carry ``pass books'' containing fingerprints, photo and information on access to non-black areas.
In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act established a basis for ethnic government in African reserves, known as ``homelands.'' These homelands were independent states to which each African was assigned by the government according to the record of origin (which was frequently inaccurate). All political rights, including voting, held by an African were restricted to the designated homeland. The idea was that they would be citizens of the homeland, losing their citizenship in South Africa and any right of involvement with the South African Parliament which held complete hegemony over the homelands. From 1976 to 1981, four of these homelands were created, denationalizing nine million South Africans. The homeland administrations refused the nominal independence, maintaining pressure for political rights within the country as a whole. Nevertheless, Africans living in the homelands needed passports to enter South Africa: aliens in their own country.
In 1953, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed, which empowered the government to declare stringent states of emergency and increased penalties for protesting against or supporting the repeal of a law. The penalties included fines, imprisonment and whippings. In 1960, a large group of blacks in Sharpeville refused to carry their passes; the government declared a state of emergency. The emergency lasted for 156 days, leaving 69 people dead and 187 people wounded. Wielding the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the white regime had no intention of changing the unjust laws of apartheid.
The penalties imposed on political protest, even non-violent protest, were severe. During the states of emergency which continued intermittently until 1989, anyone could be detained without a hearing by a low-level police official for up to six months. Thousands of individuals died in custody, frequently after gruesome acts of torture. Those who were tried were sentenced to death, banished, or imprisoned for life, like Nelson Mandela.
However, increasing local and international pressure on the government, as well as the realisation that apartheid could neither be maintained by force forever, nor overthrown by the opposition without considerable suffering, eventually led both sides to the negotiating table.
2.0 THE NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT DIMENSIONS OF THE APARTHEID CONFLICT
2.1 The Decade of Non-Violent Resistance
The 1950s saw the ANC's new strategy of mass resistance in the form of strikes, defiance campaigns and protest marches. The defiance campaign of 1952 under the banner of non-violent resistance to the pass laws and the 1954 campaign against the deliberately inferior Bantu Education system are only but a few examples. On the 26th of June 1955 the ANC’s Freedom Charter, based on the principles of human rights and non-racialism, was signed at the Congress
of the People in Soweto.
2.2 Decades of Repression
The 1960s was a decade of overwhelming repression. Matters came to a head at Sharpeville in March 1960, when 69 anti-pass demonstrators were killed by police. A state of emergency was imposed, detention without trial was introduced and the black political organizations were banned.
This led to the ANC abandoning their commitment to non-violent resistance and turn to armed struggle. Top leaders, including members of the newly formed military wing "Umkhonto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation), were arrested in 1963. In the "Rivonia trial" eight ANC leaders, including Nelson Mandela were convicted of sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Although initially the black people were left in relative political disarray, the 70’s saw a dramatic resurgence of resistance activity when the revived black trade unions started a wave of strikes in 1973, with a militancy that involved better and more effective organization.
June 1976 marked the beginning of a sustained revolt against racial segregation, when the school pupils of Soweto rose up against apartheid education, followed by youth uprisings all over the country. In 1977, news of the brutal death in detention of Steve Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, reverberated around the world, ending whatever patience the outside world might have had with the South African government.
2.3 The Decade of Violence
The 80's will be known as the decade of violence in the struggle for freedom. The P.W. Botha government embarked on a campaign to eliminate the opposition, turning the country into a police state with police, soldiers and armed vehicles patrolling the black townships and squatter camps.
The ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) retaliated by exploding bombs in restaurants, shopping centres and government buildings, killing and maiming many civilians in the process. Black people who did not participate in the resistance actions, were intimidated and victimized in violent ways by their own people. In the end the black people were living in a lawless society, constantly in fear of
their lives.
The country was in great turmoil and the anti apartheid struggle had succeeded in capturing the attention of the world. As pressures from outside as well as inside the country were building up, economic sanctions were beginning to seriously hurt the economy.
Realizing the inevitability of change, President P.W. Botha introduced a series of minor reforms in the direction of racial equality. But he stopped far short of full reform and the black people as well as the international community felt that the changes were only cosmetic.
Quotation of Steve Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, 
who died in a prison cell on 12 September 1977
3.0 NEGOTIATIONS TO END APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
The apartheid system in South Africa was ended through a series of negotiations between 1990 and 1993 and through unilateral steps by the de Klerk government. These negotiations took place between the governing National Party, the African National Congress, and a wide variety of other political organisations. Negotiations took place against a backdrop of political violence in the country, including allegations of a state-sponsored third force destabilising the country. The negotiations resulted in South Africa's first multi-racial election, which was won by the African National Congress. 3.1 SECRET MEETINGS
3.1.1 Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith
On January 4, 1974, Harry Schwarz, the Transvaal leader of the United Party, met with Mangosuthu Buthelezi and signed a five-point plan for racial peace in South Africa, which came to be known as the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith. Its purpose was to provide a blueprint for government of South Africa by consent and racial peace in a multi-racial society, stressing opportunity for all, consultation, the federal concept, and a Bill of Rights. It also affirmed that political change must take place though non-violent means, at a time when neither the National Party nor the African National Congress were looking to peaceful solutions or dialogue. The declaration enshrined the principles of peaceful transition of power and equality for all, the first of such agreements by acknowledged black and white political leaders in South Africa. 3.1.2 Early Contact - the South African Government and Nelson Mandela
The very first meetings between the South African Government and Nelson Mandela were driven by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) under the leadership of Niel Barnard and his Deputy Director General, Mike Louw. These meetings were secret in nature and were designed to develop an understanding about whether there were sufficient common grounds for future peace talks. As these meetings evolved, a level of trust developed between the key actors (Barnard, Louw, and Mandela). To facilitate future talks while preserving secrecy needed to protect the process, Barnard arranged for Mandela to be moved off Robben Island to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982. This provided Mandela with more comfortable lodgings, but also gave easier access in a way that could not be compromised. Barnard therefore brokered an initial agreement in principle about what became known as "talks about talks". It was at this stage that the process was elevated from a secret engagement to a more public engagement. The first less-tentative meeting between Mandela and the National Party government came while P. W. Botha was State President. In November 1985, Minister Kobie Coetsee met Mandela in the hospital while Mandela was being treated for prostate surgery. Over the next four years, a series of tentative meetings took place, laying the groundwork for further contact and future negotiations, but little real progress was made, and the meetings remained secret until several years later. As the secret talks bore fruit and the political engagement started to take place, the National Intelligence Service withdrew from centre stage in the process, and moved to a new phase of operational support work. This new phase was designed to test public opinion about a negotiated solution. Central to this planning was an initiative that became known in Security Force circles as the Dakar Safari, which saw a number of prominent Afrikaner opinion-makers engage with the African National Congress in Dakar, Senegal. The operational objective of this meeting was not to understand the opinions of the actors themselves—that was very well known at this stage within strategic management circles—but rather to gauge public opinion about a movement away from the previous security posture of confrontation and repression to a new posture based on engagement and accommodation. 3.1.3 Unbanning Of Opposition Organisations And The Release Of Mandela
When F.W. de Klerk became President in 1989, he was able to build on the previous secret negotiations with the imprisoned Mandela. The first significant steps towards formal negotiations took place in February 1990 with the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other banned organisations by F. W. de Klerk, and the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison. 3.2 INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS
3.2.1 Groote Schuur Minute
The negotiations began with a meeting between the African National Congress and the South African government on 4 May 1990 at the presidential residence, Groote Schuur. This resulted in the Groote Schuur Minute, a commitment between the two parties towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation as well as the removal of practical obstacles to negotiation including indemnity from prosecution for returning exiles and the release of political prisoners. 3.2.2 Pretoria Minute
On 6 August 1990 the South African government and the African National Congress extended the consensus to include several new points. This Pretoria Minute included the suspension of the armed struggle by the ANC and its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe.
3.3 NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD
The National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991 was a critical step toward formal negotiations. It was signed by representatives of twenty-seven political organisations and national and homeland governments, and prepared the way for the CODESA negotiations.
3.3.1 CODESA I
The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), under the chairmanship of the judges Michael Corbett, Petrus Shabort and Ismail Mahomed, began with a plenary session on 20 December 1991, almost two years after the unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela. The first session lasted a few days, and working groups were appointed to deal with specific issues. These working groups continued their negotiations over the next month. The negotiations took place at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park. 3.3.2 CODESA Participants
Nineteen groups were represented at CODESA, including the South African government, the National Party, the African National Congress, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Democratic Party, the South African Communist Party, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured Labour Party, the Indian National People's Party and Solidarity Party, and the leaders of the nominally independent bantustans of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. In the period between CODESA I and CODESA II in early 1992, the National Party lost three by-elections to the Conservative Party. De Klerk announced that a "whites only" referendum would be held on the issue of reforms and negotiation. The result was a landslide victory for the "yes" side, with over 68% of the voters voting for a continuation of the reforms and negotiations. 3.3.3 CODESA II And The Breakdown Of Negotiations
CODESA II (the second plenary session) took place in May 1992. In June 1992, the Boipatong massacre took place, with 46 residents of Boipatong killed by mainly-Zulu hostel dwellers. Mandela accused De Klerk's government of complicity in the attack and withdrew the ANC from the negotiations, leading to the end of CODESA II. The ANC instead took to the streets with a programme of "rolling mass action", which met with tragedy in the Bisho massacre in September 1992, when the army of the nominally independent "homeland" of Ciskei opened fire on protest marchers, killing 28. This brought a new urgency to the search for a political settlement. 3.3.4 Resumption Of Negotiations
During the negotiations, De Klerk's government pushed for a two-phase transition with an appointed transitional government with a rotating presidency. The ANC pushed instead for a transition in a single stage to majority rule. Other sticking points included minority rights, decisions on a unitary or federal state, property rights, and indemnity from prosecution for politically motivated crimes.
Following the collapse of CODESA II, bilateral negotiations between the ANC and the NP became the main negotiation channel. Two key negotiators were Cyril Ramaphosa of the ANC, and Roelf Meyer of the National Party, who formed a close friendship. It was Joe Slovo, leader of the South African Communist Party, who in 1992 proposed the breakthrough "sunset clause" for a coalition government for the five years following a democratic election, including guarantees and concessions to all sides. 3.3.5 Record of Understanding
On 26 September 1992 the government and the ANC agreed on a Record of Understanding. This dealt with a constitutional assembly, an interim government, political prisoners, hostels, dangerous weapons and mass action and restarted the negotiation process after the failure of CODESA.
3.3.6 Multiparty Negotiating Forum
On 1 April 1993 the Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF) gathered for the first time. In contrast to CODESA, the white right (the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Volksunie), the Pan Africanist Congress, the KwaZulu homeland government and delegations of "traditional leaders" initially participated in the Multiparty Negotiating Forum.
Following the Record of Understanding, the two main negotiating parties, the ANC and the NP, agreed to reach bilateral consensus on issues before taking them to the other parties in the forum. This put considerable pressure on the other parties to agree with the consensus or be left behind. In protest at the perceived sidelining of the mainly-Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Mangosuthu Buthelezi took the IFP out of the MPNF and formed the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG; later renamed the "Freedom Alliance") together with traditional leaders, homeland leaders and white right-wing groups. A period of brinkmanship followed, with the IFP remaining out of the negotiations until within days of the election on 27 April 1994. Buthelezi was convinced to give up the boycott of the elections, after Mandela offered the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, a guarantee of special status of the Zulu monarchy, and to Buthelezi, the promise that foreign mediators would examine Inkatha's claims to more autonomy in the Zulu area. This was managed with the help of a foreign team led by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. On 10 April 1993, the assassination of Chris Hani, leader of the SACP and a senior ANC leader, by white right-wingers again brought the country to the brink of disaster, but ultimately proved a turning point, after which the main parties pushed for a settlement with increased determination. The assassination of Hani sometimes is considered as an event which led to a shift of power in favour of the ANC because of Nelson Mandela's handling of the situation. The MPNF ratified the interim Constitution in the early hours of the morning of 18 November 1993. Thereafter, a Transitional Executive Council oversaw the run-up to a democratic election.
Elections
The election held on 27 April 1994 resulted in the ANC winning 62% of the vote, and Nelson Mandela becoming president, with De Klerk and Thabo Mbeki as deputies. The National Party, with 20% of the vote, joined the ANC in a Government of National Unity. Aftermath
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The real story of South Africa's giant leap from utter darkness may have begun in earnest in the mid-1980s during previously unannounced secret meetings between a litany of political stakeholders, including the leaders of the white minority regime in Pretoria, leaders of the A.N.C. movement in exile and the organization's best-known crusader, Nelson Mandela, who had been languishing in the obscure Robben Island prison, as well as representatives of the United States and British governments.
The man who spearheaded the negotiations on the side of the apartheid government was an ageing, frail-looking Pieter W. Botha, the then president of the republic. Urged on by its staunch allies in Washington, he set the cards on the table before the A.N.C in exile, whose most prominent backers were the erstwhile O.A.U, or Organisation of African Unity; Col. Moammar Qadafi's Libya and the defunct Soviet Union.
For five years, it would seem, the two sides, Pretoria and the A.N.C, struggled to find common grounds. Apparently, the perpetrators of the policy of apartheid were willing to hand political power over to the black majority, provided that the A.N.C. agreed to allow whites in a future post-apartheid dispensation to retain control of the national wealth, and, as the Americans and British insisted, that South Africa would destroy its nuclear weapons capability, built in large part with the help of the Israelis, before handing power over to the black majority, represented principally by the A.N.C. President Botha saw the inevitability of majority rule; but, he and his people were afraid leaving power and leaving nuclear weapons in the hands of an A.N.C movement they couldn't trust completely of not seeking revenge.
London and Washington were equally adamant. They would back the unconditional unbanning of the A.N.C. and the release of Mandela and other anti-apartheid activities, provided the nuclear weapons issue was dealt with once and for all, lest a future A.N.C government provide Libya's Qadafi with technology or actual material.
4.0 THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE APARTHEID CONFLICT
In the 1960s South Africa had economic growth second only to that of Japan. Trade with Western countries grew, and investment from the United States, France and Britain poured in. Resistance among blacks had been crushed. Since 1964 Mandela, leader of the African National Congress, had been in prison on Robben Island just off the coast from Cape Town, and it appeared that South Africa's security forces could handle any resistance to apartheid. In 1974, resistance to apartheid was encouraged by Portugal's withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola, after the 1974 Carnation Revolution. South African troops withdrew from Angola in early 1976, failing to prevent the liberation forces from gaining power there, and black students in South Africa celebrated a victory of black liberation over white resistance. The Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith, signed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Harry Schwarz in 1974 (see Section 3.1.1 above), enshrined the principles of peaceful transition of power and equality for all. Its purpose was to provide a blueprint for the government of South Africa by consent and racial peace in a multi-racial society, stressing opportunity for all, consultation, the federal concept, and a Bill of Rights. It caused a split in the United Party that ultimately realigned opposition politics in South Africa, with the formation of the Progressive Federal Party in 1977. It was the first of such agreements by acknowledged black and white political leaders in South Africa. In 1978 the defence minister of the Nationalist Party, Pieter Willem Botha, became Prime Minister. Botha's all white regime was worried about the Soviet Union helping revolutionaries in South Africa, and the economy had turned sluggish. The new government noted that it was spending too much money trying to maintain the segregated homelands that had been created for blacks and the homelands were proving to be uneconomical. Nor was maintaining blacks as a third class working well. The labour of blacks remained vital to the economy, and illegal black labour unions were flourishing. Many blacks remained too poor to make much of a contribution to the economy through their purchasing power – although they were more than 70 percent of the population. Botha's regime was afraid that an antidote was needed to prevent the blacks from being attracted to Communism.
Despite Ronald Reagan's support for the apartheid regime, the anti-apartheid movements in the United States and Europe were gaining support for boycotts against South Africa, for the withdrawal of U.S. firms from South Africa and for the release of Mandela. South Africa was becoming an outlaw in the world community of nations. Investing in South Africa by Americans and others was coming to an end and an active policy of disinvestment ensued. The then ShellBP used to circumvent the oil embargo on the apartheid regime by buying crude oil from Nigeria and transferring the crude oil from their ship to oil tankers headed for apartheid South Africa. This was done outside Nigeria's territorial waters. When Nigeria found out, Shell BP was nationalised. In retaliation, Margaret Thatcher's government introduced visa requirements for Nigerians visiting the United Kingdom. This was in retaliation for Nigeria refusing to pay any compensation for the nationalisation. Also many South Africans attended schools in Nigeria. Nelson Mandela has himself at several times acknowledged the role of Nigeria in the struggle against apartheid.
4.1 Tricameral Parliament
In the early 1980s, Botha's National Party government started to recognise the inevitability of the need to reform apartheid. Early reforms were driven by a combination of internal violence, international condemnation, changes within the National Party's constituency, and changing demographics—whites constituted only 16% of the total population, in comparison to 20% fifty years earlier.
In 1983, a new constitution was passed implementing a so-called Tricameral Parliament, giving coloureds and Indians voting rights and parliamentary representation in separate houses – the House of Assembly (178 members) for whites, the House of Representatives (85 members) for coloureds and the House of Delegates (45 members) for Indians. Each House handled laws pertaining to its racial group's "own affairs", including health, education and other community issues. All laws relating to "general affairs" (matters such as defence, industry, taxation and Black affairs) were handled by a cabinet made up of representatives from all three houses, where the ruling party in the white House of Assembly had an unassailable numerical advantage. Blacks, although making up the majority of the population, were excluded from representation; they remained nominal citizens of their homelands. The first Tricameral elections were largely boycotted by Coloured and Indian voters, amid widespread rioting. 4.2 Reforms And Contact With The ANC Under Botha
Concerned over the popularity of Mandela, Botha denounced him as an arch-Marxist committed to violent revolution, but to appease black opinion and nurture Mandela as a benevolent leader of blacks the government moved Mandela from Robben Island to a prison in a rural area just outside Cape Town, Pollsmoor prison, where prison life was easier. And the government allowed Mandela more visitors, including visits and interviews by foreigners, to let the world know that Mandela was being treated well. Black homelands were declared nation-states and pass laws were abolished. Also, black labour unions were legitimised, the government recognised the right of blacks to live in urban areas permanently and gave blacks property rights there. Interest was expressed in rescinding the law against interracial marriage and also rescinding the law against sex between the races, which was under ridicule abroad. The spending for black schools increased, to one-seventh of what was spent per white child, up from on one-sixteenth in 1968. At the same time, attention was given to strengthening the effectiveness of the police apparatus.
In January 1985, Botha addressed the government's House of Assembly and stated that the government was willing to release Mandela on condition that Mandela pledge opposition to acts of violence to further political objectives. Mandela's reply was read in public by his daughter Zinzi – his first words distributed publicly since his sentence to prison twenty-one years before. Mandela described violence as the responsibility of the apartheid regime and said that with democracy there would be no need for violence. The crowd listening to the reading of his speech erupted in cheers and chants. This response helped to further elevate Mandela's status in the eyes of those, both internationally and domestically, who opposed apartheid.
Between 1986 and 1988, some petty apartheid laws were repealed. Botha told white South Africans to "adapt or die" and twice he wavered on the eve of what were billed as "rubicon" announcements of substantial reforms, although on both occasions he backed away from substantial changes. Ironically, these reforms served only to trigger intensified political violence through the remainder of the eighties as more communities and political groups across the country joined the resistance movement. Botha's government stopped short of substantial reforms, such as lifting the ban on the ANC, PAC and SACP and other liberation organisations, releasing political prisoners, or repealing the foundation laws of grand apartheid. The government's stance was that they would not contemplate negotiating until those organisations "renounced violence". By 1987 the growth of South Africa's economy had dropped to among the lowest rate in the world, and the ban on South African participation in international sporting events was frustrating many whites in South Africa. Examples of African states with black leaders and white minorities existed in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Whispers of South Africa one day having a black President sent more hardline whites into Rightist parties. Mandela was moved to a four-bedroom house of his own, with a swimming pool and shaded by fir trees, on a prison farm just outside Cape Town. He had an unpublicised meeting with Botha, Botha impressing Mandela by walking forward, extending his hand and pouring Mandela's tea. And the two had a friendly discussion, Mandela comparing the African National Congress' rebellion with that of the Afrikaner rebellion, and about everyone being brothers. A number of clandestine meetings were held between the ANC-in-exile and various sectors of the internal struggle, such as women and educationalists. More overtly, a group of white intellectuals met the ANC in Senegal for talks.
4.3 Presidency of F.W. de Klerk
Early in 1989, Botha suffered a stroke; he was prevailed upon to resign in February 1989. He was succeeded as president later that year by F.W. de Klerk. Despite his initial reputation as a conservative, De Klerk moved decisively towards negotiations to end the political stalemate in the country. In his opening address to parliament on 2 February 1990, De Klerk announced that he would repeal discriminatory laws and lift the 30-year ban on leading anti-apartheid groups such as the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the United Democratic Front. The Land Act was brought to an end. De Klerk also made his first public commitment to release jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela, to return to press freedom and to suspend the death penalty. Media restrictions were lifted and political prisoners not guilty of common-law crimes were released. On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster Prison after more than 27 years in prison.
5.0 SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID
Post-apartheid South Africa was characterized variously. The economic, social and political sectors never remained the same.
5.1 POST – CONFLICT SITUATION
5.1.1 The Economic Plight of Post-apartheid South Africa
In post-apartheid South Africa, unemployment has been extremely high as the country has struggled with many changes. While many blacks have risen to middle or upper classes, the overall unemployment rate of blacks worsened between 1994 and 2003. Poverty among whites, previously rare, increased. While some have attributed this partly to the legacy of apartheid, increasingly many attribute it to the failure of government's policies. In addition, the government has struggled to achieve the monetary and fiscal discipline to ensure both redistribution of wealth and economic growth. Since the ANC-led government took power, the United Nations Human Development Index of South Africa has fallen, while it was steadily rising until the mid-1990s. Some may be attributed to the AIDS pandemic, and the failure of the government to take steps to address it in the early years. In 1990 42 percent of the population lived in poverty. In 1991 South Africa had a Gini co-efficient, which measures the extent of income inequality, of 0.68, the highest in a group of 36 developing countries. That same year the poorest 40 percent of households earned 4 percent of national income, while the richest 10 percent received more than half. In 1995 unemployment among Africans was calculated to be 37 percent - almost certainly an underestimate.
The appalling economic plight of the black majority was summed up by the Socialist Workers Organisation of South Africa:
Only one out of five African households have running water BUT every white household has running water. One quarter of all African households get less than R300 a month. Two thirds get less than the breadline - R900 a month. BUT two thirds of white households get more than R2000 a month. Two thirds of African children and half of Coloured children live in overcrowded houses BUT only 1 out of 100 white children live in overcrowded conditions. Less than half of African kids live in a proper brick house. The rest live in shacks or huts BUT most white children live in a brick house.
Leaving in place such poverty and inequality would help to perpetuate the desperation and misery that have produced levels of violence, both political and criminal, making South Africa one of the most dangerous societies in the world. It would also, over time, undermine the political achievements of the ANC led mass movement.
5.1.2 The Political Situation in Post-apartheid South Africa
Amid the cynicism and torpor that descended over the globe after it turned out that 1989 had not, after all, ushered in a new world order, South Africa's first democratic elections in April 1994 shone out like a beacon. In an era when politicians were generally held in profound contempt, the new State President, Nelson Mandela, towered like a colossus. Here at least there was a story that seemed to have a happy ending, as the new 'rainbow nation' stepped proudly into the future.
The sweeping victory secured by the African National Congress (ANC) in the elections after all marked the climax of a struggle that had been going on since before the movement's foundation in 1912. It was a struggle for which Mandela had spent 27 years in prison, a struggle that had been revived by the great Soweto school students' rising of 16 June 1976, a struggle that, above all, had been taken to even greater heights by the township insurrections and workers' strikes of 1984-1986. Around the world millions had identified with the cause of the black majority in South Africa, had supported it by taking part in demonstrations and consumer boycotts, and now felt the ANC's triumph as theirs as well. Apartheid, the barbarous system of racial domination that had made South Africa (in the words of one of its own diplomats) 'a polecat among nations', was finally gone.
How well did the ANC led Government of National Unity (GNU) fulfill the hopes raised by its entry to office? Commentators typically approach this question by launching a sort of pre-emptive strike. They talk about the problem of 'expectations'. By this they mean that the black people who voted for the ANC in April 1994 did so in the belief that the political transformation represented by black majority rule would rapidly usher in a social and economic transformation as well. Having won the vote, they expected from an ANC dominated government jobs, houses, and schools as well. But - say the commentators - these expectations are 'unrealistic'. The GNU, like governments everywhere, had to worry about enhancing competitiveness and reducing public spending. The masses' hopes for a rapid improvement in their material conditions were deferred indefinitely.
5.1.3 The Dismissal of Winnie Mandela
Nevertheless, in the early months of 1995 a crisis developed around Winnie Mandela's role in the government. A series of factors were involved - rows involving her high handed behaviour in the Women's League and another ANC affiliate, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, allegations of corruption (which were used to justify an illegal police raid on her home), and a speech she made attacking the slow pace of change. Nelson Mandela made two unsuccessful attempts to sack her. The first time, in February, Mbeki talked him out of it. The second time, in April, the unlikely figure of Buthelezi came to Winnie Mandela's rescue, arguing that, as a leader of one of the governing parties, he had not, as the constitution required, been consulted over her dismissal. Despite these fiascos, she was finally removed.
The Weekly Mail welcomed the prospect of Winnie Mandela's dismissal as the 'Fall of a Greedy Elite'. Undoubtedly there were serious allegations of corruption against not only her, but also against Mokaba over the National Tourism Foundation he had set up with donor funds but which subsequently went bust. Indeed Winnie Mandela was no socialist. She lived a luxurious lifestyle, and her politics were based on no serious class analysis of South African society. She encouraged her supporters to look to her for improvements of their lot, rather than to organise for themselves. Her unholy alliance with Buthelezi over her dismissal, moreover, probably discredited her with many who had previously looked to her.
None of this, however, can alter the fact that Winnie Mandela was the only prominent figure in the Revolutionary Alliance to give sharp and clear expression to the masses' demands for rapid and dramatic change. To their everlasting shame, the socialist intellectuals and trade union and community activists who had emerged in the 1970s and 1980s to create a powerful left in South Africa had, by contrast, stayed silent. For all her many faults, Winnie Mandela had acted as a lightning conductor for popular aspirations. Yet she offered no coherent alternative to the GNU, merely a more radical version of the ANC's nationalism.
5.1.4 The Mandela Government And The Workers' Movement
From the long historical view, the ANC's victory represented the culmination of the great wave of national liberation movements whose rebellion against colonial domination is one of the grand themes of the 20th century. At the same time, however, the ANC is set apart from other nationalist movements by its close alliance with a powerful and independent working class movement. This distinctive feature is itself a reflection of the peculiarities of South African historical development, and in particular of the way in which industrial capitalism established itself from the late 19th century onwards through promoting institutions of racial domination that after 1948 were elaborated into the apartheid system. By a happy historical irony, the very success of segregation and apartheid in promoting the development of modern capitalism in South Africa gave rise to a black working class whose growing economic power underlay the popular insurgencies of the 1970s and 1980s.
The principal organisational expression of this power was the trade union movement which emerged after the Durban strikes of January-February 1973. Its strongest wing was COSATU, closely allied to the ANC from its inception in 1985. The importance of the unions to the nationalist movement was demonstrated after the emergency imposed in June 1986 caused the collapse of the various community based organisations - civic associations, youth and student congresses, etc - that had flourished during the township risings of the mid-1980s. The civics in particular never fully recovered from this setback.
Thereafter COSATU served as the backbone of the ANC led mass movement, for example, mobilising for the stayaways of 1992-3, and, in the Witwatersrand at least, providing the cadre of shop stewards who formed teams of canvassers during the 1994 elections. The presence of ex-trade union leaders such as Naidoo and Erwin in important ministerial posts, and the important role played by the former mine workers' leader Ramaphosa as ANC secretary general provided some indication of COSATU's contribution to the nationalist movement. (Indeed, no less than 50 COSATU leaders, many of them very senior officials, took up political office after April 1994.)
Following the elections, the Financial Times acknowledged the strength of the organised working class: 'With 3.5 million members, or 26 percent of the economically active population, the unions are a leading force in society.' The development even under de Klerk of institutionalised social bargaining was an acknowledgement of this fact. To that extent Eddie Webster is right to highlight what he calls 'the multi-layered institutionalised bargaining process between classes' as a distinctive feature of post-apartheid South Africa. He goes on to argue that '[t]his unique combination in the Third World of a powerful and strategic labour movement in alliance with a left-centre government allows one to envisage the emergence of a social-democratic programme' that, while not challenging 'the fact of capitalist economic ownership', would promote 'equity-led growth' based on 'tripartite agreements between labour, management and government'.
The main evidence Webster could offer in support of this hope was the new Labour Relations Bill announced by the Labour Minister, Tito Mboweni, in February 1995. Certainly this sought to take South Africa further along the road of corporatist bargaining. In addition to industry wide negotiations between employers and unions through Bargaining Councils (a new name for the Industrial Councils set up by General Smuts in 1923), every workplace with more than 100 employees would be required to set up a Workplace Forum to promote the sharing of information and decisions; moreover, the details of the new labour law were to be hammered out by the concerned parties at the main social-bargaining body, NEDLAC.
The bill, however, had a number of negative features. Unlike the old apartheid era legislation, it did not place employers under a duty to bargain. Though the right to strike was recognised, it was denied to workers providing 'essential services' and 'maintenance services': the latter was a new category, covering the potentially very broad range of activities whose interruption would lead to the 'physical destruction of plant, machinery or the working area'. Employers were given the right to lock out, and to hire scab labour. Moreover, the existence of a Workplace Forum would impose restrictions on industrial action. Unorganised workers and those in small workplaces were left out in the cold. Only a registered union could organise a picket, and employees in workplaces with less than ten trade union members were denied the right to a shop steward.
Some 3.9 million strike days were 'lost' in South Africa in 1994 - up from the previous year, but below the 4.2 million in 1992. Given both the effective disappearance of the political stayaways that were so characteristic of the 'struggle years' of the 1980s and the coming to office of a government strongly supported by the organised working class and stuffed with its former leaders, this figure represented a formidable degree of militancy. Workers showed in practice their vision of a transformation that went well beyond winning the rights of political citizenship.
At the centre of their immediate preoccupations was pay. In the first nine months of 1995 wage disputes were responsible for 93 percent of all strikes. In fact 1995 saw quite a sharp fall in the level of the industrial struggle. There were only 870,000 strike days 'lost' in the first three quarters of the year, compared to a five year average of 2.6 million. But beneath these figures was a marked shift in the pattern of the economic class struggle. Strikes were concentrated for the first time in the public sector and the parastatals. This reflected to some degree the fact that the new government had lifted the old regime's ban on public sector strikes. But, more importantly, it was a consequence of the fact that state workers' wage increases were being held below the rate of inflation, while workers in the private sector, where union organisation was strongest, were able to win settlements of around 10 to 12 percent, which kept their pay in line with prices. The third quarter of 1995 saw a sharp rise in strike activity compared to the very low levels recorded in the first half of the year (775,000 strike days between July and September) with two especially bitter disputes involving nurses and municipal workers in Gauteng province .
Far, however, from seeing in the strikes an opportunity for workers to get a 'foretaste' of their 'emancipation', the government bitterly attacked any manifestation of direct action on the ground. The police, armed with all the brutal apparatus familiar from the apartheid era of guns, batons, dogs, and teargas, were regularly mobilised against strikers.
Opening parliament in February 1995, Mandela made a point of attacking violence by striking workers. In April 1995 he denounced workers' and students' protests at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits): 'Where we have put our foot down is where people use the right of protest to commit crimes, to destroy property, to take hostages, to interfere with the rights of other students.' And when policemen in the Transkei mutinied, he ordered the SANDF in to crush them. 'I told them, if you have to use live bullets, use them,' he recalled in a subsequent interview. (This threat was not an idle one: when black policemen at Orlando East station in Soweto went on strike in January 1995 in protest against their racist treatment, the all white riot squad from Krugersdorp was called in; it opened fire on the strikers, killing one and injuring others, and then arrested them, beating up and insulting some.)
ANC leaders more junior than Mandela displayed the same hostility towards strikes. Thus Philip Dexter, an MP and former official of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), attacked the Gauteng nurses' strike. 'Previous industrial action including in the public sector, took place in the context of apartheid,' he explained, under 'a government openly hostile to black workers and their aspirations. The ANC is the complete opposite of this.' Admittedly, 'public service workers do have legitimate grievances', but these should wait upon the creation of a 'Public Service Forum' pursuing 'a strategy of co-determination between the government as employer and representative of the people's will and the public service workers, together with other directly affected interest groups'.
5.2 CURRENT ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA
a. Government
After each parliamentary election, the National Assembly elects one of its members as President; hence the President serves a term of office the same as that of the Assembly, normally five years. No President may serve more than two terms in office. The President appoints a Deputy President and Ministers, who form the Cabinet. The President and the Cabinet may be removed by the National Assembly by a motion of no confidence. South Africa has three capital cities: Cape Town, as the seat of Parliament, is the legislative capital; Pretoria, as the seat of the President and Cabinet, is the administrative capital; and Bloemfontein, as the seat of the Supreme Court of Appeal, is the judicial capital. b. Politics
c. Protests
Since 2004, the country has had many thousands of popular protests, some violent, making it, according to one academic, the "most protest-rich country in the world". Many of these protests have been organised from the growing shanty towns that surround South African cities. In 2008, South Africa placed 5th out of 48 sub-Saharan African countries on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance. South Africa scored well in the categories of Rule of Law, Transparency & Corruption and Participation & Human Rights, but was let down by its relatively poor performance in Safety & Security. The Ibrahim Index is a comprehensive measure of African governance, based on a number of different variables which reflect the success with which governments deliver essential political goods to its citizens.
6.0 SUMMARY OF THE END OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
With international pressure continuing to grow and the country on the verge of becoming ungovernable, the South African government was left with no other option then to look for a negotiated settlement, recognizing the demands of the blacks and ending the racial segregation system.
In August 1989 Botha resigned as President because of ill health and F.W. de Klerk was sworn in as acting State President. This was to be the turning point towards the end of racial segregation in South Africa.
In February 1990 de Klerk announced the dismantling of the racial segregation system, the un-banning of all liberation movements and the release of political prisoners, in particular Nelson Mandela.
After more then a year of preliminary talks, the real negotiations for a changeover of power to a majority government began on the 20th of December 1991 at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). All significant political role players were given the opportunity to take part in the negotiations
During 1993 agreement was reached on a new constitution and the forming of a Government of National Unity, in which all parties polling more then 5% in the elections, would be represented in the cabinet. After 5 years the Government of National Unity would become a straight majority rule government.
Although there was considerable political violence by some extremist elements during the negotiation period, particularly in the wake of the killing of Chris Hani, chief of ANC military wing "Umkhonto we Sizwe", the first free elections in South Africa on the 26th of April 1994 went off peacefully, amidst a feeling of goodwill throughout the country.
REFERENCES
Relevant Websites
http://allafrica.com/stories/201002160438.html
http://www.south-africa-tours-and-travel.com/apartheid.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa_under_apartheid
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