In this work, we shall focus our attention on some International organizations such as African Union (AU), European Union(EU), Organization of American States (OAS), Arab League But will limit our
We shall also give a detail account of some conflicts situations (selecting from different regions) where such organizations were involved in peace Mediation in the past and outcome of such initiative. Meanwhile, we shall limit our attention to two of the regional organizations.
Scientific, technical, political, economic changes and developments have made it impossible for the individuals, nations and nation-states to live independently without interaction or association with each other. Also no modern state can exist successfully without external relationship with other states and their citizens. It is this acceptance of state interdependence by all nations that has led to the development and the formation of international organizations. (Aja Akpuru-Aja 2000)
International Regional Organizations
An international organization can and may be defined as a voluntary association of states and individuals founded for the promotion of members economic. Political, social, cultural, scientific and other interests. International organizations operate for and among states, not over them. They operate on four levels of universal/global, continental, regional and functional levels.
Recently, the disappointment experience at failure of the United Nations to develop as an instrument for maintaining international peace and security in the world, have made policy planners turn to both regional and functional areas to overcome the inability and military security on the basis of its own strength in other words, the development of international organizations is a reflection of the relative incapacity of states to serve their own interests and the peoples’ interest sufficiently well.(Ezeh D .S 1992). Let us look at the following International Regional Organizations
African Union
African Union, formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU), organization of African nations created to promote continental peace, unity, and cooperation. The organization works to resolve conflicts between nations through its commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and to coordinate political, economic, cultural, scientific, medical, and defense policies.(Oyebola 1997) AU PEACE INITIATIVES (POST-1993)
Conflict resolution has also been handled effectively by the AU through the concept of preventive diplomacy which has taken many forms, including the use of the good offices of the Secretary General, the use of Eminent Persons, Special Envoys, Representatives of the Secretary General, direct contacts between the AU and the government of the country concerned, as well as missions from the General Secretariat to the country in question. Since the adoption of the Mechanism, the following are some of the major initiatives undertaken by the AU: (Nathan, L., 2004,)
- In collaboration with the countries of the region, the OAU was instrumental in facilitating the Arusha Peace Agreement which was one of the principal instruments of the Rwandan peace process. The OAU also deployed a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the implementation of the resultant ceasefire. NMOG was ultimately incorporated into the UN mission in Rwanda that was formed in 1994.
- In Burundi, the OAU was engaged from the beginning in sustaining and promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It established an Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB), comprising both civilian and military components.
- In Somalia, the OAU worked in close collaboration with the UN and the countries of the region in the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and it continues to seek a lasting solution to the crises in that country.
- In Liberia, the role of the OAU was critical in the mobilisation of international political, financial and material support for the initiative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The OAU promoted the evolution of a regional consensus behind the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), and contributed to the Abuja Peace Accord and the process that culminated in the successful elections held in that country during mid-1997.
- In Sierra Leone, the OAU worked closely with the UN, and the regional actors in the negotiations that brought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the conference table, and is still engaged in the search for a political and security solution to the stalemate brought about by the coup d'état in the country in June 1997.
- The OAU supported the initiatives undertaken by the four African Heads of State aimed at diffusing the crisis in the Central African Republic, and has been supportive of the efforts of the leader of the Mission for the Surveillance of the Bangui Accords (MISAB), General Amadou Toure.
- The OAU appointed, jointly with the UN, a Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the Great Lakes and was involved in the negotiations which brought an end to the Congo/Zaire crisis.
- The OAU organised the referendum in Western Sahara, in conformity with the UN Peace Plan, and deployed official observers to support the UN mission.
- Finally, the OAU helped to defuse the post-election crises in the Congo and Gabon, and was instrumental in the successful resolution of the crisis in the Comores by facilitating the agreement between (then exiled) President Djahor and the government of national unity. It continues to play a leading role in seeking a solution to the current crisis in the Comores.
Nicolas Bwakira, AU Special Mamadou Bah, AU Special Nicolas Bwakira, AU Special
Representative to Somalia Representative to Somalia Representative to Burundi
Source: AU
African Union in Congo Republic: NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING PROCESSES
Wars as complex as the ones that took place in Congo DR would normally have series of attempts made to mediate between the belligerent forces at different periods. The prominent ones however included:
- The Lusaka Peace Accord (1999), the Pretoria All-Inclusive Agreement (2002) the Goma Accord (2007) the Kenya Peace Agreement (2007) (We shall discuss the Lusaka Peace Accord of(1999)
The Lusaka Peace Accord (1999)
In July 1999, at a summit in Lusaka, Zambia, the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, was appointed by the African Union to facilitate talks among the belligerent forces. During the Negotiation process, the leaders of Uganda, Rwanda, Congo DR, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola signed a peace agreement known as the Lusaka Peace Accord. One of the key elements of the Accord was the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Another important element of the Accord was the call for political dialogue among Congolese political and armed groups to settle their differences peacefully and to map out a new political chapter for Congo DR. (Mwanasali, 2008).
Outcome
There was a temporary ceasefire which was monitored by the UN Peacekeeping force (MONUC) commissioned specially for the purpose. The Lusaka Accord however did not include the rebel groups, thus making the belligerent to resume hostilities. This led to the assassination of the then President of Congo, Laurent Kabila who was later succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila.
The AU and Sudan Peace Bargaining
Darfur Peace Bargaining Process
.
According to Peter Dixon and Mark Simmons (2006), the contribution of African Union to the success or otherwise of Sudan’s Peace process over past decades is by nature discreet, such are often not well documented. This is certainly true in Sudan, but other factors also contribute to the difficulty of assessment in Sudanese context. The complexities of civil wars since independence have been made more acute by the powerful role of the military in Sudanese government and in the governance of the opposition—held areas.
Military negotiators, such as territory force levels and ceasefires, do not necessarily see the need for a peace negotiation. Moreover, power has been in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals and the wasr has often been fought through the use as proxies of militias that have frequently changed alliance. The atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust that this encourages secrecy in formal negotiations process
The war in Dafur erupted in 2002-03 when the Sudan liberation Movement / Army and LM/A and Justice & Equity Movement (EM) emerged to fight the government of Sudan (Gos). The conflict is rooted in ongoing political, economic and cultural marginalization since colonization era absorption of the western Territories into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Violent conflict in the region had been steadily increasing since the 1980s when drought intensified the competition for scarce land and water resources.
The Birth of the Peace Process
The rebellion in Darfur caught the government by surprise. The government of North Darfur, Ibrahim Suleiman was inclined to negotiate with the “rebel”, but was soon removed from his post by Khatrem.
The first international involvement was led by Chadian president Idris Deby, who was concerned about the effect of conflict induced on Chad and had some standing both with the Gos (who had helped him achieve power) and Zaghawa leaders within the SLA ( his own ethnicity is Zaghawa). He mediated a 45-day ceasefire between the Gos and SLA/A in the Chadian border in September 2003. The ceasefire soon disintegrated and futher Abeche meeting collapsed with Deby blaiming the failures on the demands of SLAM?A and JEM. This assertion severl compromised his impartial mediator and led to rebels to demand international observer’s presence at any further talk.
With African Union (AU) assistance, Chad mediated a ceasefire agreement to allow humanitarian access in Dafure at Ndjamena, Chad in 2004 between the Gos and a joint SLA/A and Jem delegation. The Gos had objected to UE, UE and eventually compromised to AU as mediators with international observation only for talks on humanitarian issues.
The Outcome of the Bargaining
The agreement of the modalities for the establishment of the ceasefire commission and Deployment of observers, signed in Addis Ababa in May 2004, acknowledge the AU as the led international body in Darfur. This followed by the protocols on security and the humanitarian situation both signed in the Nigeria Capital Abuja in November 2004, and the declaration of principles, signed in may 2005.
The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in January 2005 by the Gos and Sudan people’s Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A) had little impact on AU-mediated process in Abuja. There had from the start been minimal overlap between the processes. LGAD was a small regional grouping in the Sudanese peace process and Somali transitional process were its only experiences of mediation and the AU saw no need to consult it. In addition, a piecemeal, regional approach to talk favored Gos policy.
In January 2011, South Sudan held a peaceful and transparent referendum on Southern secession
or unity, as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).3 An estimated 3.9 million
people were registered to vote, including those residing in other countries. An estimated 3.8
million people, or 97.5%, voted in the referendum. According to the South Sudan Referendum
Commission (SSRC), 98.8% voted for secession, while 1.1% voted for unity. In early February,
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir officially accepted the result of the referendum. The United
States, the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and others endorsed the result.
On July 9, 2011, South Sudan will officially declare independence and the new country reportedly
will be named the Republic of South Sudan.
Abyei was also expected to hold a referendum on January 9, 2011, to decide whether to retain its
current special administrative status or to be part of Southern Sudan. However, the referendum
did not take place, in large part due to the government of Sudan’s rejection of agreements on
Abyei. In late December 2009, the Sudan National Assembly passed the South Sudan and Abyei
Referendum Act. However, the Abyei Commission was never established as called for in the Act
and residents of Abyei were not registered to vote. In February and early March 2011,
government forces and their allies attacked several villages around Abyei and many residents fled
the town of Abyei in early March 2011. On March 3, 2011, the State Department, in a press
release, condemned the violence in Abyei. (Africa Report 80, 2)
Arab League
The Arab League was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 with six members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen joined as a member on May 5, 1945.At the end of World War II, the Palestinian Arabs were leaderless. The mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin al-Husayni had been in exile since 1937 and spent the war years in occupied Europe, actively collaborating with Nazi leadership. His brother Jamal al-Husayni was interned in Southern Rhodesia during the war. As the war ended, Amin al-Husayni managed to escape to Egypt and stayed there until 1959, when he moved to Lebanon. Al-Husayni died in Beirut, on 4 July 1974.( Jonathan Glancey (2003-04-19).
In November 1945, the Arab League reestablished the Arab Higher Committee as a supreme executive body of Palestinian Arabs in the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine. The committee was immediately recognised by Arab League countries and the Mandate government recognised the new Committee two months later. However, it fell apart due to infighting. In June 1946, the Arab League imposed upon the Palestinians the Arab Higher Executive, renamed as "Arab Higher Committee" in 1947, with Amin al-Husayni as its chairman and Jamal al-Husayni as vice-chairman.
On April 13, 1950, the League members signed an agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, which committed the signatories to coordination of military defense measures.
Member States of the Arab League
(and the year of admitance)
(and the year of admitance)
1. | Egypt (1945) | 9. | Sudan (1956) | 16. | Oman (1971) |
2. | Iraq (1945) | 10. | Morocco (1958) | 17. | Qatar (1971) |
3. | Jordan (1945) | 11. | Tunisia (1958) | 18. | Mauritania (1973) |
4. | Lebanon (1945) | 12. | Kuwait (1961) | 19. | Somalia (1974) |
5. | Saudi Arabia (1945) | 13. | Algeria (1962) | 20. | Palestine (1976) |
6. | Syria (1945) | 14. | Bahrain (1971) | 21. | Djibouti (1977) |
7. | Yemen (1945) | 15. | U.A.E. (1971) | 22. | Comoros (1993) |
8. | Libya (1953) |
The International Monetary Fund website, in an Mar. 25, 2003 entry titled "League of Arab States," contained the following description of the Arab League:
"The League of Arab States was established on March 22, 1945 upon signature of its Pact by seven Arab States. The League is a national and regional organization that seeks to promote closer ties among member-states and coordinate their policies and their economic, cultural and security plans with a view to developing collective cooperation, protecting national security and maintaining the independence and sovereignty of member-states; thereby enhancing the potential for joint Arab action in all fields.
In the political field, the League is entrusted with the tasks of defending the supreme interests and national causes of the Arab world through the implementation of joint action plans at both regional and international levels as well as through the coordination of the relations of member-states with regional and international organizations.
The League is also entrusted with the task of examining whichever disputes that may arise between member-states and to adopt whichever resolutions and measures as may be deemed necessary to settle such disputes by peaceful means.
Economic, social and cultural activities constitute principal and vital elements of joint action in addition to the fact that they provide solid grounds for development, security, liberation and economic integration."
In the political field, the League is entrusted with the tasks of defending the supreme interests and national causes of the Arab world through the implementation of joint action plans at both regional and international levels as well as through the coordination of the relations of member-states with regional and international organizations.
The League is also entrusted with the task of examining whichever disputes that may arise between member-states and to adopt whichever resolutions and measures as may be deemed necessary to settle such disputes by peaceful means.
Economic, social and cultural activities constitute principal and vital elements of joint action in addition to the fact that they provide solid grounds for development, security, liberation and economic integration."
Mar. 25, 2003 - International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Arab League and Israeli - Palestinian Conflicts Barganing
The Arab League, in an entry on its website titled "Peace Process" (accessed Mar. 2004), stated the following position:
"Despite of all the unfavorable conditions and international pressures, the Arab stand vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict is still in grasp of its National Principles. Continuously seeking to achieve them by all convenient means, the following are the most important of those principles, as defined in resolution 6053 of the League Assembly, on the Ministerial level, on March 12th, 2001:
· The assertion on proceeding to support the peace process, in accordance with the international legitimacy resolutions, with an emphasis on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 'Land for Peace' Principle, and the Palestinian people's right for destiny determination over its territories.
· Re-emphasizing its previous resolution 5945, which stipulates: 'providing concrete support to the orientation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization leadership, which is being the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people, towards materializing the declaration of establishing the Palestinian state during the current year, along with taking all possible steps and measures, and initiating the international communications needed to achieve the same'. In this direction, the league assembly calls upon all Arab, Islamic, and friendly states for the recognition of the Palestinian state once declared..
· Invoking the new American administration to place the Middle East peace process within its priority, calling upon this administration to instigate the principles of Madrid Peace Conference, and compliance with the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and 'Land for Peace' Principle, along with laying due concern to the Palestinian people's right for destiny determination, without any foreign intervention, in order to restore security and stability in the Middle East region.
· Calling upon Russia and the European Union to exercise an active role in overcoming the obstacles blocking the establishment of a just comprehensive, and permanent peace in the region; and urging them to sustain efforts aimed at stopping Israel's attempts to obstruct the establishment of the subject peace."
Arab Peace Initiative In Egypt-Isreali Conflict
The Arab Peace Initiative was first proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in the Beirut Summit. The peace initiative is a proposed solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular.
The initiative was initially published on March 28, 2002, at the Beirut Summit, and agreed upon again in 2007 in the Riyadh Summit. Unlike the Road Map for Peace, it spelled out "final-solution" borders based explicitly on the UN borders established before the 1967 Six-Day War. It offered full normalization of relations with Israel, in exchange for the withdrawal of its forces from all the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.
A number of Israeli officials have responded to the initiative with both support and criticism. The Israeli government has expressed reservations on 'red line,' issues such as the Palestinian refugee problem, homeland security concerns, and the nature of Jerusalem. However, the Arab League continues to raise it as a possible solution, and meetings between the Arab League and Israel have been held.
The Outcome of the Bargaining
The peace between Egypt and Israel has lasted for thirty years, and Egypt has become an important strategic partner of Israel. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, a former defence minister known for his close ties to Egyptian officials has stated that "Egypt is not only our closest friend in the region, the co-operation between us goes beyond the strategic." As part of the agreement, the US began economic and military aid to Egypt, and political backing for its subsequent governments. From the Camp David peace accords in 1978 until 2000, the United States has subsidized Egypt's armed forces with over $38 billion worth of aid. Egypt receives about $2 billion annually. Nevertheless, the peace is often described as a "cold Peace", with many in Egypt skeptical about its effectiveness. The Arab-Israeli conflict has kept relations cool and anti-semitic incitement is prevalent in the Egyptian media. US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks suggest that the Egyptian military continues to see Israel as its primary adversary. In 2008, The Egyptian army conducted simulated military exercises against an "enemy" Israel.
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 led to fears in Israel about the future of the treaty, although the Israeli Prime Minister stated that he expected any new Egyptian government to keep the peace treaty with Israel, as it has served both countries well. After the Egyptian Army took power on 11 February 2011, it announced that Egypt would continue to abide by all its international and regional treaties. However, Ayman Nour, An influential Egyptian opposition figure and likely presidential candidate called for Cairo’s peace treaty with Israel to be "reassessed". Article 24 of the Palestinian National Charter of 1964
THE RELIVANCE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Traditionally, regionalism implies co-operation among states in geographically proximate and delimited areas for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue areas. In most of the successful examples of regionalism, states that are already partners to solid political processes (based on shared and complementary values) devolve collective decisions to structures that supplement, rather than supplant, national institutions. While regionalism may lead to the creation of new political organisations over time, regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other, and states remain the essential building blocks from which such arrangements are constructed.
The goal of security in Africa is to mitigate threats in the domestic sphere, and to avoid the recurrent state collapse witnessed in the last few years. Regionalism, in the African context, must acknowledge that the political infrastructure for security co-operation in the various subregions, is still in elementary stages of development. And, as states deal with the outcome of failed nationhood and are increasingly consumed by primary conflicts leading to civil and secessionist wars, regional security arrangements need to be modest measures for the prevention and containment of certain conflicts, rather than aim at the construction of elaborate institutional mechanisms. The focus therefore needs to be on looser structures of co-operation, ones which can stabilize relations, prevent the spill-over of conflicts, secure emerging common values and, perhaps, lay the foundation for nascent security regimes.
States within a given region should take on the responsibility for separating, isolating and conciliating domestic belligerents.
Be that as it may, a regional approach is possible, as long as neighbours sharing borders are excluded from certain conflict management situations. On the other hand, combining the principle of neighbourhood with the principle of distant impartiality, to create mixed teams of peacemakers good mediation process, as in the case of Liberia, Somalia, Congo etc. However, in general terms, keeping neighbours entirely out of each other's problems carries the risk of creating avenues of suspicion and new resentments.
In recent times, regional involvement in conflict resolution has met with varying degrees of success. Individual countries have facilitated some conflict management and resolution, e.g. Nigeria and the Ivory Coast in Liberia; Kenya and Zaire in Rwanda and Burundi. Regional groupings, initially created as economic integration organisations, have also increasingly been entrusted with security and peacemaking functions. The prime example of this shift is African Union (AU), to help resolve the Liberian conflict, Congo, Somalia etc and Arab League, in the case of Israeli/Egypt and Palestinian Conflicts
Since its formation, the AU have made a substantial contribution to restore peace in Africa and has partake in so many conflict bargaining which many were prosperous.
Also, other regional organisations like the Arab League , has also hosted and facilitated negotiating sessions between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the rebel forces from southern Sudan, in an attempt to end this devastating civil war. Ill-suited to serve as a mediator, IGAD has paid considerable attention to the bolstering of its capability, and is presently seen as the best vehicle to break the Sudanese impasse, because the mediating parties have a vested interest in regional stability.
These experiences demonstrate the potential for regional organisations to act as peacemakers and mediators. An overriding interest in their neighbourhood's stability, and their actual or potential leverage with disputing parties means that regional organisations such as AU, Arab League may be uniquely qualified to launch preventive diplomacy efforts, and to effect viable and sustainable negotiated settlements in cases of civil war.
The goal of security in Africa is to mitigate threats in the domestic sphere, and to avoid the recurrent state collapse witnessed in the last few years. Regionalism, in the African context, must acknowledge that the political infrastructure for security co-operation in the various subregions, is still in elementary stages of development. And, as states deal with the outcome of failed nationhood and are increasingly consumed by primary conflicts leading to civil and secessionist wars, regional security arrangements need to be modest measures for the prevention and containment of certain conflicts, rather than aim at the construction of elaborate institutional mechanisms. The focus therefore needs to be on looser structures of co-operation, ones which can stabilize relations, prevent the spill-over of conflicts, secure emerging common values and, perhaps, lay the foundation for nascent security regimes.
States within a given region should take on the responsibility for separating, isolating and conciliating domestic belligerents.
Be that as it may, a regional approach is possible, as long as neighbours sharing borders are excluded from certain conflict management situations. On the other hand, combining the principle of neighbourhood with the principle of distant impartiality, to create mixed teams of peacemakers good mediation process, as in the case of Liberia, Somalia, Congo etc. However, in general terms, keeping neighbours entirely out of each other's problems carries the risk of creating avenues of suspicion and new resentments.
In recent times, regional involvement in conflict resolution has met with varying degrees of success. Individual countries have facilitated some conflict management and resolution, e.g. Nigeria and the Ivory Coast in Liberia; Kenya and Zaire in Rwanda and Burundi. Regional groupings, initially created as economic integration organisations, have also increasingly been entrusted with security and peacemaking functions. The prime example of this shift is African Union (AU), to help resolve the Liberian conflict, Congo, Somalia etc and Arab League, in the case of Israeli/Egypt and Palestinian Conflicts
Since its formation, the AU have made a substantial contribution to restore peace in Africa and has partake in so many conflict bargaining which many were prosperous.
Also, other regional organisations like the Arab League , has also hosted and facilitated negotiating sessions between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the rebel forces from southern Sudan, in an attempt to end this devastating civil war. Ill-suited to serve as a mediator, IGAD has paid considerable attention to the bolstering of its capability, and is presently seen as the best vehicle to break the Sudanese impasse, because the mediating parties have a vested interest in regional stability.
These experiences demonstrate the potential for regional organisations to act as peacemakers and mediators. An overriding interest in their neighbourhood's stability, and their actual or potential leverage with disputing parties means that regional organisations such as AU, Arab League may be uniquely qualified to launch preventive diplomacy efforts, and to effect viable and sustainable negotiated settlements in cases of civil war.
CONCLUSION
The experience over the regional organization and its conflict management in the international nation in general, and the AU in particular, gives us hope for the future of the continent and its capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. As efforts are made to assist the regional organizations by the United Nations, in this regard, it is important that the continent is left to be , and to seek solutions to its own problems. However, we must also take cognizance of the regional's limitations, especially in terms of logistic and financial resources for meaningful peace initiatives. There is, therefore, also a need to continue to galvanise international support to assist regional organisations in its resolve to prevent and manage conflicts and, increasingly, also to engage in peace operations.
The greatest advantage of having the Regional bodies mid-way up the pyramid, is that it is neither too far from, nor too close to the theatre of conflicts. It is, therefore, in a position to co-ordinate all the activities relating to conflict management, as performed by the various entities which lie above or below it. This publication will hopefully play an important role in the thinking behind the construction of this edifice, of a pyramid for peace in various regions.
The greatest advantage of having the Regional bodies mid-way up the pyramid, is that it is neither too far from, nor too close to the theatre of conflicts. It is, therefore, in a position to co-ordinate all the activities relating to conflict management, as performed by the various entities which lie above or below it. This publication will hopefully play an important role in the thinking behind the construction of this edifice, of a pyramid for peace in various regions.
